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ABSTRACT

Regional disparities in immigration enforcement have existed for
decades, yet they remain largely overlooked in immigration law
scholarship. This Article theorizes that bottom-up pressurefrom states and
localities, combined with top-down pressures and policies established by
the President, produce these regional disparities in enforcement. The
Article then provides an empirical analysis demonstrating enormous
variations in how Immigration and Customs Enforcement's field offices
engage in federal enforcement around the United States, focusing on field
offices located in "sanctuary"regions, which provide a more hospitable
political climate for immigrants, and "antisanctuary"regions, where the
climate is more hostile. By analyzing data related to detainers, arrests,
removals, and detention across thesefield offices, the Article demonstrates
substantial differences between field offices located in sanctuary and
antisanctuaryregions, as well as variationswithin each of those groups. In
order to promote more equitable and transparentenforcement, the Article
offers recommendations regarding agency guidelines, rulemaking,
performancemetrics, and institutionaldesigns, examiningthe strengths and
limitations of these approaches.
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INTRODUCTION

Stark variations exist in immigration enforcement depending on the
region of the United States.' Such disparities persist even when one
compares field offices in regions with generally similar political climates.
For example, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)'s Seattle field
office-which oversees Washington, Oregon, and Alaska-arrests
noncitizens with no criminal history at nearly four times the rate of the San
Francisco field office-which oversees northern California and Hawaiiand removes them at nearly eight times the rate of the San Francisco field
office.2
Although these regional disparities in immigration enforcement have
existed for decades, they remain largely overlooked in immigration law
scholarship. Legal scholarship focused on immigration federalism tends to
"treat[] the federal government as a singular entity vis-a-vis the states," 3
while articles scrutinizing the federal government tend to probe the
allocation of immigration authority between the President and Congress. 4
This Article, on the other hand, looks within the Executive Branch,
specifically within ICE, an agency within the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS), in order to explore how ICE Enforcement and Removal
Operations (ERO) field offices actually engage in federal enforcement
around the country. 5 By analyzing data related to detainers, arrests,
removals, and detention across ICE ERO's field offices, this Article
demonstrates drastic regional variations in key aspects of federal
immigration enforcement.
This analysis indicates that federal immigration enforcement reflects a
type of "checkerboard federalism," where substantive national policies are
geographically differentiated.6 The regional focus of this Article also adds
1.

See infra Part Il.

2.

Id.

3.

Pratheepan Gulasekaram & S. Karthick Ramakrishnan, The President and Immigration

Federalism, 68 FLA. L. REv. 101, 106 (2016).
4.

See, e.g., Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodriguez, The President and Immigration Law

Redux, 125 YALE L.J. 104 (2015); Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodriguez, The President
and Immigration Law, 119 YALE L.J. 458, 460-62 (2009).
5.
As used in this Article, "ICE's field offices" specifically refers to ICE Enforcement and
Removal Operations (ERO) field offices.
6.

Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Executive Federalism Comes to America, 102 VA. L. REV. 953, 997-

98 (2016) (arguing that partisan polarization in the United States has produced a version of "executive
federalism" that facilities "state-differentiated national policy"). The "executive federalism" that

Professor Bulman-Pozen describes unfolding in the United States is "loosely akin to Canada's
checkerboard federalism or Europe's differentiated integration." Id. at 955; see also ALKUIN KOLLIKER,
FLEXIBILITY AND EUROPEAN UNIFICATION: THE LOGIC OF DIFFERENTIATED INTEGRATION (2006);
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to a nascent body of scholarship shining light on the geographic structure of
federal agencies and analyzing the implications of regional organization for
federalism and federal administrative law.7 As David Owen has observed,
"all the new spotlights illuminating administrative federalism have yet to
shine on the geographic structure of federal agencies themselves." 8 By
offering an innovative regional analysis, this Article makes both theoretical
and empirical contributions to our understanding of federal agencies and to
our understanding of ICE in particular.
To date, the legal scholarship on "immigration federalism" has examined
a wide range of issues related to federal, state, and local relations, with little
attention to regional dynamics. Among other things, scholars have
examined state power and preemption doctrines;9 efforts of states and
localities to resist federal enforcement;' 0 the federal government's attempts
to "commandeer" states and localities in order to secure their cooperation;"
regulation of access to social benefits as a way for states and localities to
impact immigrant integration;" the impact of overlapping local, state, and

&

Herman Bakvis, Checkerboard Federalism? Labour Market Development Policy in Canada, in
CANADIAN FEDERALISM: PERFORMANCE, EFFECTIVENESS, AND LEGITIMACY 197 (Herman Bakvis

Grace Skogstad eds., 2002).
Yishai Blank & Issi Rosen-Zvi, Reviving Federal Regions, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1895 (2018)
7.
(arguing that the federal government advances federalist ideals by administering authority through its
regional offices); Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Our Regionalism, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 377 (2018) (examining
federalist ideals in federal regional schemes); David Fontana, Federal Decentralization, 104 VA. L.
REV. 727

(2018)

(arguing

that federal decentralization

promotes federalist ideals);

Dave

Owen, Regional Federal Administration, 63 UCLA L. REV. 58 (2016) (arguing that federal
decentralization promotes federalist values, using the structure of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers as
an example); see also Elizabeth Magill & Adrian Vermeule, Allocating Power Within Agencies,
120 YALE L.J. 1032, 1035 (2011) (noting the need to "crack[] open the black box of agencies").
8.

Owen, supra note 7, at 62.

9.
See, e.g., Daniel 1. Morales, Transforming Crime-BasedDeportation, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 698,
760-61 (2017) (arguing that crime-based deportation should be handled by states instead of by the
federal government); Pratheepan Gulasekaram & Karthik Ramakrishnan, Immigration Federalism: A
Reappraisal, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2074 (2013); Juliet P. Stumpf, States of Confusion: The Rise of State
and Local Power over Immigration, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1557 (2008).
See, e.g., PRATHEEPAN GULASEKARAM & S. KARTHICK RAMAKRISHNAN, THE NEW
10.
IMMIGRATION FEDERALISM 57-86 (2015) (surveying state and local laws pertaining to noncitizens).
See, e.g., Christine Kwon & Marissa Roy, Local Action, National Impact: Standing Upfor
11.
Sanctuary Cities, 127 YALE L.J.F. 715 (2018); Christopher N. Lasch et al., Understanding "Sanctuary
Cities", 59 B.C. L. REV. 1703, 1709-13 (2018); Trevor George Gardner, The Promise and Peril of the
Anti-CommandeeringRule in the HomelandSecurity Era:Immigrant Sanctuary as an IllustrativeCase,
34 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 313 (2015); Spencer E. Amdur, The Right of Refusal: Immigration
Enforcement and the New CooperativeFederalism, 35 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 87 (2016).
12.
GULASEKARAM & RAMAKRISHNAN, supra note 10, at 57-86; Ming H. Chen, Immigration
and Cooperative Federalism: Toward a DoctrinalFramework, 85 U. COLO. L. REV. 1087, 1091 (2014)
(arguing for cooperative federalism in law that regulate immigrants "between borders," such as
"regulations that touch on education, housing, drivers' licenses, and health care"); Stella Burch
Elias, The New Immigration Federalism, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 703, 703 (2013) (discussing the potential for
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federal law enforcement on particular communities; 3 conflicts between
state laws and local "sanctuary" or "antisanctuary" laws ("immigration
localism");" and multilayered "sanctuary networks."15
In this rich body of literature, the only articles discussing "immigration
regionalism"-a term coined a decade ago by Professors Keith Aoki and
John Shuford-propose a regional approach to developing solutions to
multifaceted immigration issues, such as employment and labor. 16 As
Professor Shuford explained, "[i]ndividual states, interstate areas, and substate districts might function as federal immigration regions ('FIRs') in a
manner and structure similar to the federal court system."" Cristina M.
Rodriguez has also argued that immigration's distinct regional implications
require regional solutions, at least with respect to integration.18 While these
innovative arguments merit further exploration, they do not emphasize
enforcement or address ICE's existing regionalstructure, which is the focus
of this Article.
Only a handful of prior articles have examined regional variations in
immigration enforcement. Professors Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia and Leon
Wildes documented regional variations in two types of prosecutorial
discretion: deferred action status and stays of removal based on information
obtained through FOIA requests.1 9 Virgil Wiebe analyzed state and local
policies in Minnesota and found that differences in federal regional offices

"immigrant-inclusionary rulemaking" by states and localities); Cristina M. Rodriguez, The Significance
of the Local in Immigration Regulation, 106 MICH. L. REv. 567 (2008) (arguing that diverse state and

local policies that affect immigrant integration are beneficial).
13.

See, e.g., Jennifer M. Chacdn, Immigration Federalismin the Weeds, 66 UCLA L. REv. 1330

(2019).
14.

See, e.g., Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Rick Su & Rose Cuison Villazor, Anti-Sanctuary and

Immigration Localism, 119 COLUM. L. REv. 837 (2019).
15.

Rose Cuison Villazor & Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Sanctuary Networks, 103 MINN. L. REV.

1209, 1251-71 (2019).
16.
Keith Aoki & John Shuford, Welcome to Amerizona-Immigrants Out!: Assessing
"Dystopian Dreams" and "Usable Futures" of Immigration Reform, and Considering Whether
"ImmigrationRegionalism" Is an Idea Whose Time Has Come, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1, 63 & n.252

(2010).
17.
John Shuford, In the Key of Aoki: Immigration Regionalism (eco), 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1655, 1693 (2012).
18.
Rodriguez, supra note 12, at 582-90, 600-05, 641.
19.

Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, My Great FOIA Adventure and Discoveries of Deferred Action

Cases at ICE, 27 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 345, 347-56 (2013) (examining disparities in grants of stays of
removal and deferred action status, two forms of prosecutorial discretion); Leon Wildes, The Deferred
Action Program of the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services: A Possible Remedy for
Impossible Immigration Cases, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 819, 829 (2004) (examining variations in grants
of deferred action status); see also Joseph Landau, BureaucraticAdministration:Experimentation and

Immigration Law, 65 DUKE L.J. 1173, 1196-1121 (2016) (providing case studies indicating that
frontline immigration officers can influence executive policy).

1598

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 99:1593

resulted in different outcomes. 20 Spencer Amdur highlighted significant
variations among states in Criminal Alien Program removals and the use of
immigration detainers, noting that "these data suggest some real
geographic variation along political lines" but that "[m]uch more empirical
work remains to understand federal enforcement practices." 2 ' Additionally,
Emily Ryo and Ian Peacock have provided an impressive empirical analysis
of county participation in immigration detention that found geographic
disparities. 22 In a distinct but related context, Jaya Ramji Nogales, Andrew
Schoenholtz, and Philip Schrag's seminal article, Refugee Roulette,
documented disparities in asylum decisions, including by asylum officers
within DHS. 23
This Article is the first to provide a more comprehensive analysis of
regional variations by ICE field office in several key aspects of immigration
enforcement. Part I begins by presenting historical background on the
regional nature of immigration enforcement, explaining how the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), which was ICE's
predecessor, struggled to control autonomous regional offices. Part I then
explains ICE ERO's current geographic structure, which, at the time of
writing, divided the territory of the United States into twenty-four field
offices that oversee areas that vary in size from groups of states to single
states to groups of counties.
Part II provides a theoretical framework for regional variations by
examining the different forces on ICE field offices that can produce regional
effects. First, it discusses bottom-up pressure by states and localities that
cooperate or refuse to cooperate with ICE in multiple ways. States and
localities can decide to cooperate or refuse to cooperate with ICE by making
critical decisions about whether to enter into 287(g) agreements that
deputize law enforcement agencies to be involved in immigration
enforcement, honoring ICE detainer requests, allowing ICE officers into
jails and prisons, adopting "sanctuary" or "antisanctuary" policies, and
entering into contracts with ICE regarding detention facilities. Because
ICE's field offices are physically located in regions with dramatically
Virgil Wiebe, Immigration Federalism in Minnesota: What Does Sanctuary Mean in
20.
Practice?, 13 U. ST. THOMAS LJ. 581 (2017).
Amdur, supra note 11, at 156-57 (noting that, "[i]f true, this [variation] would be a prime
21.
example of the 'executive federalism' explored by Professor Jessica Bulman-Pozen in a recent article").

Emily Ryo & Ian Peacock, Jailing Immigrant Detainees: A National Study of County
22.
Participationin Immigration Detention, 1983-2013, 54 L. & SOC'Y REV. 66, 83-94 (2020).
Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Andrew I. Schocnholtz & Philip G. Schrag, Refugee Roulette:
23.
Disparitiesin Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295, 372-78 (2007) (examining disparities in the
decisions made by asylum officers within DHS, immigration judges and members of the Board of
Immigration Appeals within DOJ, and federal appellate court judges).
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different policies and politics regarding immigration enforcement, those
differences may affect federal enforcement decisions.
At the same time, there are top-down pressures on ICE field offices by
the President, the Secretary of DHS, and the Director of ICE, and those
pressures can come in various forms, such as Executive Orders, guidelines,
regulations, internal agency procedures, and performance metrics. The
President can seek to promote consistency in enforcement decisions by
setting clear national priorities, or the President can encourage
decentralization by leaving much to the discretion of frontline officers. Part
II argues that the convergence of pressures from above and below on
individual ICE ERO field offices produces substantial regional variations.
This Part also contends that although immigration enforcement is usually
discussed as an example of "cooperative federalism," it also reflects a form
of "checkerboard federalism" or "executive federalism" based on
geographically disparate enforcement policies and practices.
Part III presents an empirical analysis of variations in immigration
enforcement across ICE's twenty-four field offices using data from Fiscal
Year 2019. This Part analyzes data on detainer requests, administrative
arrests, removals, detention, and alternatives to detention. The data
demonstrate enormous disparities among ICE's field offices in all of these
areas. Not only are there striking differences between field offices located
in sanctuary regions and field offices in antisanctuary regions, but there are
substantial differences within each of these categories as well. These
disparities are not limited to cases involving noncitizens who have been
charged or convicted of a crime, where variations in state and local policies
regarding cooperation or noncooperation would have the most impact on
federal enforcement. Substantial variations also exist regarding the arrest,
detention, and removal of noncitizens with no criminal history. The results
indicate that ICE field offices are not simply implementing central policies.
Rather, they are applying theirown versions of federal immigration policies,
which are influenced by the state and local policies in their region."
Part IV examines the implications of these regional variations for
policymaking and institutional design. First, Part IV examines the benefits
and challenges involved in using enforcement guidelines, rulemaking, and
performance metrics to achieve more uniformity in the implementation of
immigration policies. Second, Part IV offers three modifications to
institutional design that could help achieve more uniform federal
immigration enforcement. The Article concludes by stressing the
24.
Blank & Rosen-Zvi, supra note 7, at 1895 (arguing that "[federal] regions are misguidedly
viewed as mere enforcers and implementers of central policies" and proposing alternative views of
federal regions as mediators and coordinators).
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importance of more consistent and transparent enforcement practices when
fundamental liberties are at stake.
I. THE REGIONAL STRUCTURE OF IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT
A. The Creation of INS and Its Autonomous Regional Offices
The history of immigration enforcement in the United States shows
geographical disparities going back centuries and regional variations among
field offices that persist to this day. For nearly a century after the United
States was founded, individual states passed laws regulating immigration."
That practice ended in 1875, when the Supreme Court held that immigration
regulation was solely within the authority of the federal government.26 I
27
the late 1880s, Congress passed several statutes regulating immigration.
With these new statutes came a need for federal officials to become
involved in immigration enforcement. U.S. Customs Collectors were
stationed at ports of entry to collect the fifty-cent head tax imposed on each
immigrant by the Immigration Act of 1882, while "Chinese Inspectors"
enforced the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882.28 States also remained
involved in immigration enforcement through state boards and commissions
that received direction from the Treasury Department. 29
The Immigration Act of 1891 created the first federal agency in charge
of immigration." That agency was initially located within the Treasury
Department and then moved to the Department of Labor in 1913, where it
split into two parts: one focused on immigration and the other on
naturalization." In 1933, these two components merged again and became

25.
Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of American Immigration Law (1776-1875), 93
COLUM. L. REV. 1833, 1834 (1993).
Chy v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275 (1875).
26.
27.
These include the Immigration Act of 1882, Pub. L. No. 47-376, 22 Stat. 214 (1882) (codified
as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1551); Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, Pub. L. No. 47-126, 22 Stat. 58 (1882)
(repealed 1943); and Alien Contract Labor Laws, Pub. L. No. 48-164, 23 Stat. 332 (1885) (repealed
1952).
28.
U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGR. SERVS., OVERVIEW OF INS HISTORY 3 (2012),
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/document/fact-sheets/INSHistory.pdf [https://perma.cc/2M9464SB].
29.
Id.
The agency was called "the Office of the Superintendent of Immigration" until 1895, when
30.
it became the "Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization." Id. at 4.
Id. at 5. The Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization became part of the Department of
31.
Commerce and Labor in 1903. In 1913, the Department of Commerce and Labor split into two separate
cabinet departments, and the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization divided into the Bureau of
Immigration and the Bureau of Naturalization, which were both housed within the new Department of

Labor. Id.
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the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), which was moved to the
Department of Justice in 1940.32
INS had two main units: one focused on enforcement and the other on
granting immigration benefits. 33 Initially, INS operated through "field and
branch" offices, but in 1942, the field offices were redesignated as
headquarters for twenty-two districts. 34 The number of districts fluctuated
between sixteen in 1943 and thirty-seven in 1963, at times including several
districts abroad. 35 Four regional offices were established in 1955 to oversee
the district offices.36 The district offices handled adjudications, inspections,
investigations, detention, and deportation. Some of these district offices
launched their own initiatives. For example, in the 1950s, INS's San
Francisco office initiated a "Chinese Confession Program" that offered
"amnesty" to Chinese immigrants who confessed to fraud. 37
In 1974, the Office of Management and Budget set a long-term goal for
federal agencies to adopt ten standard regions with uniform boundaries and
common regional office locations.38 The Attorney General asked INS to
adjust its regional structure accordingly, but INS determined that adopting
the standard structure would be impractical "because its personnel and
workload are centered in areas with many [noncitizens]." 39
INS proposed an alternative plan in 1975 that shifted regional boundaries
"to equalize personnel distribution, workload, and span of control among
the regions." 40 The new plan created four regional offices, with headquarters
in San Pedro, California (Western), Burlington, Massachusetts (Eastern), St.
Paul, Minnesota (Northern), and Dallas, Texas (Southern). 4 The new

32.
33.

Id. at 5, 8.
Id. at 9-10.

34.
See Records of Immigration and NaturalizationService, 85.5 DistrictOffice Records of INS
ARCHIVES,
https://www.archives.gov/research/guide-fedNAT'L
and
its
Predecessors,
records/groups/085.html#85.5 [https://perma.cc/GJ4R-WVYY].

35.
36.
37.

Id.
Id.
Aziz Z. Huq, Article II and Antidiscrimination Norms, 118 MICH. L. REv. 47,107 (2019).

38.

See EXEC. OF. OF THE PRESIDENT, OFF. OF MGMT. & BUDGET, CIRCULAR A-105 (1974),

in OFF. OF MGMT. & BUDGET, GEN. SRVCS. ADMIN., FPCD-77-39, STANDARDIZED FEDERAL
REGIONS-LITTLE

EFFECT ON AGENCY MANAGEMENT

OF PERSONNEL app. I at 25 (1977),

https://www.gao.gov/assets/fpcd-77-39.pdf [https://perma.cc/8SDL-DW3V].
39.
Letter from Comptroller General of the United States to Sen. Byrd, GGD-76-27 (Nov. 11,
1975) [hereinafter Letter to Senator Byrd], https://www.gao.gov/assets/120/114022.pdf
[https://perma.c/MIX3Z-K5JX].
40.
Id.
41.
Id. See also U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO/GGD-86-130-BR, BRIEFING REPORT
TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTORS, IMMIGRATION: PROPOSED CLOSING OF INS'S NORTHERN REGIONAL
(1986),
https://www.gao.gov/assets/80/76001.pdf
BENEFITS
UNCERTAIN
OFFICE:
[https://perma.cc/6JBE-DNSP].
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boundaries aligned INS's four regional offices with the ten standard federal
regional offices.42
By this point, there was already recognition of significant disparities in
INS decisions. In fact, in 1979, under the Carter administration, INS
proposed regulations to codify standards on the use of discretion in
adjustment of status applications and other matters in order to promote
greater consistency, 43 but the proposed regulations were rescinded in 1981
by the Reagan administration.44 Practices following the passage of the
Immigrant Responsibility and Control Act (IRCA) in 1986 further
highlighted regional variations. The IRCA established a legalization
program and made it illegal for employers to hire undocumented workers,
authorizing INS to sanction employers who failed to comply. 45 However,
regional offices had different evidentiary requirements for legalization
applications46 and followed different procedures and policies in issuing
sanctions against employers.4 7
In 1989, an issue paper prepared for the Attorney General observed that
INS's structure had created "autonomous regional offices whose officials
often compete with the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner of INS
for control over their operations." 48 The paper further noted that "[e]ach
Regional Commissioner exercise[d] independent control over both
immigrationpolicy and managementfor 'their'partof the country."49
A 1991 report by the Government Accountability Office (GAO)
similarly criticized INS for having "degenerated into a group of segmented
42.

The INS's Western Regional Office covered standard federal region IX; the Eastern Regional

Office covered standard federal regions I, II, and II; the Northern Regional Office covered standard

federal regions V, VII, VIII, and X; and the Southern Regional Office covered standard federal regions
IV and VI. See Letter to Senator Byrd, supra note 39.

43.

Factors to Be Considered in the Exercise of Administrative Discretion, 44 Fed. Reg. 36,187,

36,191 (proposed June 21, 1979) (stating that the purpose of the rule was "to assure that all applicants
and petitioners receive fair and equal treatment before the Service").

44.
Factors to Be Considered in the Exercise of Administrative Discretion, 46 Fed. Reg. 9,119,
9,119 (proposed Jan. 28, 1981) (reasoning that "it is impossible to foresee and enumerate all of the
favorable or adverse factors which may be relevant and should be considered in the exercise of
administrative discretion" and expressing concern that "[l]isting some factors, even with the caveat that
such list is not all inclusive, poses a danger that use of guidelines may become so rigid as to amount to
an abuse of discretion"); see also Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules,

93 YALE L.J. 65, 92-97 (1983) (criticizing INS's refusal to codify standards for exercising discretion).
45.
Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359,
8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)-(b).
46.
U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO/GGD-91-28, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS,
IMMIGRATION MANAGEMENT: STRONG LEADERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT REFORMS NEEDED TO
https://www.gao.gov/assets/160/150030.pdf
80
(1991),
PROBLEMS
SERIOUS
ADDRESS

[https://perma.cc/793H-2L6N].
47.
Id. at 35-36.
48.
Id. at 79 (quoting the issue paper without citation) (emphasis added).
49.
Id. (emphasis added).
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autonomous programs, each trying to handle its own set of problems with
little attention to their interrelatedness."" 0 The report stressed that
"[riegionalpriorities began to take precedence over nationalpriorities,"
which "hampered effective resource allocation and resulted in inconsistent
program implementation."'" Regional Commissioners had "developed their
own policy agendas and frequently refused to follow guidance and advice
from headquarters."" Compounding this situation, the agency's leadership
in Washington "refused to directly confront" the politically appointed
Regional Commissioners, implicitly encouraging regional autonomy.5 3
In 1993, criticism about INS's regional inconsistencies came directly
from the Supreme Court. In Reno v. Flores, the Court observed that INS's
treatment of detained juveniles had varied "on a regional and ad hoc basis,
with some INS offices releasing unaccompanied alien juveniles not only to
their parents but also to a range of other adults and organizations," while the
Western Regional Office had "adopted a policy of limiting the release of
detained minors to a parent or lawful guardian, except in unusual and
extraordinary cases.""
The following year, INS made changes to its organizational structure in
order to provide "more direct oversight of field units."55 One of the main
problems was that a single INS headquarters manager in Washington, D.C.
was responsible for supervising thirty-three district directors and twentyone chiefs of Border Patrol sectors. It was such a large number that
supervision was "too far removed" and "district directors and Border Patrol
chiefs were often able to operate independently of headquarters direction." 6
The reorganization established four Executive Association Commissioner
positions for policy and planning, programs, management, and field
operations, which helped shift some management activity to officials closer
to the field."
In 1996, Congress enacted two sweeping new immigration laws: The
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) and the Illegal

Id. at 3 (emphasis added).
Id. at 78 (emphasis added).
Id. at 79.
Id.
Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 295-96 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted).
U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO/GGD-97-132, REPORT TO THE COMMISSIONER OF
THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, INS MANAGEMENT: FOLLOW-UP ON SELECTED
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

PROBLEMS

4

(1997)

[hereinafter

GAO

REPORT],

https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GAOREPORTS-GGD-97-132/pdf/GAOREPORTS-GGD-97132.pdf [https://perma.cc/7JQE-DTWT].
56.
Id. at 39.
57.
Id. at 86-88.
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Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA). 58 These
new laws expanded the range of criminal offenses that trigger mandatory
detention, 59 eliminated key defenses to deportation,60 made it more difficult
to apply for asylum, 61 and established a process of expedited removal that
allows for removal without a hearing before an immigration judge. 62
Despite INS's organizational restructuring in 1994 and huge increases to
its staff and budget, the agency was still in disarray after the 1996 laws were
implemented. 63 A 1997 GAO report found that field managers still generally
viewed headquarters as not being "in touch with events, problems, and
concerns of the field."" There was "uncertainty among INS managers about
the roles and responsibilities of headquarters executives," as well as
"confusion among field managers regarding roles and responsibilities." 65
According to GAO, "field manuals containing policies and procedures on
how to implement immigration laws" were still "out-of-date" in 1997.66 One
consultant "reported that three different versions of guidance on
naturalization procedures had been distributed throughout INS and that
some offices were using the wrong version."67 So some people may have
been denied citizenship by one office even though they would have been
granted by another.
In short, immigration enforcement in the years leading up to 9/11 was
uneven at best and could even be described as chaotic, with
semiautonomous regional offices making inconsistent decisions and lack of
clarity about the law among frontline officers.

58.
See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat.
1214 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.); Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigration Responsibility Act (IIRIA), Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996) (codified in
scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).

59.

See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 (INA)

§ 236(c),

8 U.S.C.

§ 1226

(mandatory

detention grounds).

60.
See, e.g., INA § 212(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (waiver of excludability) (repealed 1996); INA §
244, 8 U.S.C. § 1254 (suspension of removal) (repealed 1996).
61.
See INA § 208(a)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B) (imposing a one-year deadline to apply
for asylum after entering the United States).

62.
63.

See INA § 235(b)(1)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i).
See Immigration and Naturalization Service: Overview of Management and Program

Challenges, Testimony Before the Subcomm. on Immigr. and Claims of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,

GAO/T-GGD-99-148 4-5 (1999) [hereinafter GAO Testimony] (statement of Richard M. Stana,
Associate

Director,

Administration

https://www.gao.gov/assets/1

of

Justice

Issues,

General

10/108056.pdf [https://perma.cc/RKY7-NG5M].

Government

INS's staff increased from 19,000 to 31,000 and its budget more than doubled. Id at 2.
64.
GAO REPORT, supra note 55, at 45.

65.
66.

GAO Testimony, supra note 63, at 5.
Id.

67.

GAO REPORT, supra note 55, at 48.

Division),

Between 1993 and 1998,
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B. The Current GeographicStructure of Immigration Enforcement
The attacks of 9/11 prompted massive reorganization within the federal
government. The Homeland Security Act, passed in November 2002,
created DHS by integrating all or part of twenty-two different federal
agencies and programs. 68 INS was among the agencies incorporated into
DHS. 69 In the Homeland Security Act, Congress required the Secretary of
DHS to submit a plan "for consolidating and co-locating ... any regional
offices or field offices" of the agencies transferred to DHS, as well as
"portions of regional and field offices of other Federal agencies, to the
extent such offices perform functions" transferred to the Secretary of
DHS. 70
DHS began operating in March 2003 and includes ICE, Customs and
Border Protection (CBP), and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
(USCIS), which absorbed the main functions previously performed by
INS. 7 ' In 2004, DHS informed Congress that it would implement a
"Regional Concept" to integrate internal functions and improve
coordination with external partners. 72 A 2010 DHS Bottom-Up Review
report recommended "realign[ing] component regional configurations into
a single DHS regional structure." 73 However, in April 2012, a senior DHS
officer involved in that report announced that DHS would not implement
that recommendation. 74 DHS later identified operational and budgetary
constraints as challenges to implementing "a single DHS regional/field
office structure," noting that each of DHS's components have "a different
regional or field office structure based on unique mission needs." 75
Establishing a single set of regional offices would be challenging because a
regional footprint that made sense for CBP along the border may not be well
suited to another component, like ICE, which operates in the interior. 76
While DHS's components use different terms, including "regions,"
"field offices," "districts," and "sectors," these offices all function like

68.

See The Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (codified in

scattered titles of U.S.C.).

69.
70.

See Homeland Security Act
6 U.S.C. § 346.

§§ 402, 471,

6 U.S.C.

§§ 202,

291.

U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGR. SERVS., supra note 28, at 11.
71.
72.
U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-12-185R, LETTER AND BRIEFING TO SENATE AND
HOUSE COMMITTEES ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENT, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY: EFFORTS TO ASSESS REALIGNMENT OF ITS FIELD OFFICES STRUCTURE 1 (2012),

https://www.gao.gov/assets/650/649000.pdf [https://perma.cc/D8PE-PXLD].
73.
Id. at 2.
74.
Id.
75.
Id. at 14.
76.
Id. at 25.
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federal regions in the sense that they cover the entire territory of the United
77
States and there is no higher office between them and headquarters. As
Professor Jessica Bulman-Pozen has pointed out, "there is substantial
divergence in federal agencies' regional organization."78 The ten-region
scheme actually "remains a minority approach, and the 'chaos' of various
regional configurations that past Presidents have sought to quell remains."79
At the time of writing, ICE ERO was organized into twenty-four "field
80
offices" across the United States, with no higher-level "regional offices."
ICE's field offices are not like the field offices of some agencies that are
"located in smaller towns far removed from the seats of political power"
and "in charge of relatively small territories."81 Rather, nine of them are
located in the same major cities included among the ten "standard" federal
regions: Boston, New York City, Philadelphia, Atlanta, Chicago, Dallas,
Denver, San Francisco, and Seattle. 82 The fifteen other offices are also
located in major cities, including multiple cities in California and Texas,
due to the size of the immigrant population in those states. ICE's field
83
offices are, therefore, similar to the regional offices of other agencies.
The geographical boundaries of ICE's field offices vary greatly. Ten ICE
field offices are responsible for multiple states: Atlanta, Boston, Chicago,
Denver, Detroit, New Orleans, Philadelphia, Salt Lake City, Seattle, and St.
Paul. 84 Five of ICE's field offices are responsible for a single state:
Baltimore, Miami, Newark, Phoenix, and Washington, D.C. (responsible
for Virginia and D.C.).85 Six field offices are responsible for multiple
counties within a state: Buffalo, Houston, Los Angeles, New York City, San
Antonio, and San Diego. 86 And three ICE field offices combine interstate
areas: Dallas (North Texas and Oklahoma); El Paso (West Texas and New
7
Mexico); and San Francisco (northern California and Hawaii).8 Two of the
77.

See generally Blank & Rosen-Zvi, supra note 7 (explaining federal regions).

78.

Bulman-Pozen, supra note 7, at 389.

79.
Id. at 390.
80.
See
ICE:
2021
ERO
Field
Offices,
https://www.ice.gov/doclib/about/offices/ero/pdf/eroFieldOffices.pdf

ICE
(Dec.
3,
2020),
[https://perma.cc/P56C-TCXV].

In 2021, after this Article was completed, the San Antonio Field Office was split into two, creating a
new field office in Harlingen, Texas. The analysis presented here does not include the Harlingen field
office. See U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF'T, ICE ANNUAL REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2021 8 (2022),

https://www.ice.gov/doclib/eoy/iceAnnualReportFY202I.pdf [https://perma.cc/LE2S-844U].
81.

Blank & Rosen-Zvi, supranote 7, at 1911.

Kansas City is the tenth "standard" federal region and does not have an ICE field office. For
a map of the ten "standard" regions, see HHS Regional Offices, DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERVS.,
82.

https://www.hhs.gov/about/agencies/iea/regional-offices/index.html [https://perma.cc/7DX7-QQW5].

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

ICE: 2021 ERO FieldOffices, supra note
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

80.
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offices are also responsible for U.S. territories: San Francisco (Guam and
Saipan) and Miami (Puerto Rico and U.S. Virgin Islands).88
The chart below explains each field office's geographic area of
responsibility. The chart also provides the estimated unauthorized
population of the geographic area within each field office's jurisdiction to
assist with comparisons across field offices. 89 Unfortunately, information
about the personnel and resources allocated to each ERO office was not
available and therefore could not be included in this chart. Differences in
how resources are allocated among field offices may certainly play a role in
explaining some of the variations. As discussed further below, allocation of
resources is one way that the federal government can push enforcement in
a certain direction.

88.

Id.

89.
The size of the undocumented population is used as a reference point in other studies when
comparing states and localities. See, e.g., Ten-Fold Difference in Odds of ICE Enforcement Depending
Upon Where You Live, TRAC IMMIGR. (Apr. 11, 2019), https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/555/#f4
[https://perma.cc/79YS-UU8E]. This Article relies upon estimates of the undocumented population in
states and counties developed by the Migration Policy Institute (MPI). Unauthorized Immigrant
Population Profiles, MIGRATION POL'Y INST., https://www.migrationpolicy.org/programs/usimmigration-policy-program-data-hub/unauthorized-immigrant-population-profiles
[https://perma.cc/5BJQ-GMKY]. Other sources have their own estimates. See, e.g., U.S. Unauthorized
Population Estimates by State, 2016, PEW RSCH. CTR., https://www.pewhispanic.org/interactives/u-sunauthorized-immigrants-by-state/ [https://perma.cc/A2Q4-TVMH]; Estimates of Undocumented and

Eligible-to-Naturalize Populations by State, CTR. FOR MIGRATION STUD., http://data.cmsny.org
[https://perma.cc/NT9Y-H74R]. For the New York Field Office, MPI provides estimates of the
unauthorized population for the following counties: Bronx, King, Nassau, New York, Queens,
Richmond, Suffolk, and Westchester (totaling 754,000). See MIGRATION POL'Y INST., supra. For the
remaining counties, the undocumented population was estimated as one-third of the foreign-born

population using data from censusreporter.org, which yielded the following estimates: Dutchess
(11,267), Putnam (4,575), Sullivan (2,035), Orange (14,100), and Ulster (4,494), totaling 36,471. That
total was conservatively rounded down to 36,000. See Dutchess County, NY, CENSUS REP.,

https://censusreporter.org/profiles/05000US36027-dutchess-county-ny/

[https://perma.cc/5NGD-

C7PB]; Putnam County, NY, CENSUS REP., https://censusreporter.org/profiles/05000US36079-putnamcounty-ny/
[https://perma.cc/4F6D-3LG8];
Orange
County,
NY,
CENSUS
REP.,

https://censusreporter.org/profiles/05000US36071-orange-county-ny/ [https:/perma.cc/67QX-7W7M];
Ulster County, NY, CENSUS REP., https://censusreporter.org/profiles/05000US3611 1-ulster-county-ny/
[https://perma.cc/3MJL-QAM4]. The estimated undocumented population for the area overseen by the
Buffalo field office was calculated by subtracting the estimated undocumented population for the area
overseen by the New York field office from the total estimated undocumented population for the state
of New York. For the Los Angeles Field Office, the estimate of the undocumented population for San

Luis Obispo County was provided by the Public Policy Institute of California. See Joseph Hayes & Laura
Hill, Undocumented Immigrants in California, PUB. POL'Y INST. OF CAL. (Mar. 2017),
https://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/jtf/JTF_UndocumentedlmmigrantsJTF.pdf

DYHB].

[https://perma.cc/S4UG-
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Table 1: ICE ERO's Geographical Structure in FY 2019: 24 Field Offices with Area of
Responsibility and Estimated Size of Unauthorized Poopulation.
Unauthorized
Population

ICE Field Office

Area of Responsibility

Atlanta

Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina

716,000

Baltimore
Boston

_
Maryland
Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Hampshire, Vermont, Rhode
Island

226,000
370,000

Buffalo

Upstate New York

Chicago
Dallas
Denver

Illinois, Indiana, Wisconsin, Missouri, Kentucky, Kansas
North Texas, Oklahoma
Colorado, Wyoming

Detroit
El Paso

Michigan, Ohio
New Mexico
West
Texas,
_
-

Houston
Los Angeles

East Texas

Miami
New Orleans

732,000

New York City

Florida, Puerto Rico, U.S. Virgin Islands
Louisiana, Alabama, Mississippi, Tennessee, Arkansas
Counties of New York, Kings, Bronx, Richmond, Queens,
Dutchess, Nassau, Putnam, Suffolk, Sullivan, Orange, Rockland,
Ulster, and Westchester

Newark

New Jersey

425,000

Philadelphia

Pennsylvania, West Virginia, Delaware

187,000

Phoenix

Arizona

281,000

Salt Lake City
San Antonio
San Diego

Utah, Nevada, Montana, Idaho
South Texas and Central Texas
San Diego County, Imperial County
Northern California, Hawaii, Guam, Saipan

288,000

45,000

--

-----

-

788,000
687,000
186,000

189,000
148,000

--

643,000
1,456,000

_

Counties of Los Angeles, Orange, Riverside, San Bernardino,
Ventura, Santa Barbara and San Luis Obispo

San Francisco
Washington, Oregon, Alaska
Seattle
Iowa, Minnesota, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota
St. Paul
Washington, D.C. Washington, D.C. and Virginia

339,000
790,000

_

411,000
187,000
1,074,000
359,000
-

184,000
276,000

Given the long history of regional disparities in immigration
enforcement operations, it is not surprising that differences among ICE's
field offices persist to this day. However, a deeper examination of the forces
that can produce such regional effects is necessary to better understand
them, especially given the rapidly changing landscape of the relationship
between states and the federal government when it comes to immigration.
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II. FORCES THAT PRODUCE REGIONAL EFFECTS
A regional perspective focusing on the geographic areas of responsibility
for ICE field offices provides valuable information about how immigration
enforcement works in practice that cannot be understood by looking at
federal, state, and local policies alone. This section first considers how states
and localities can influence ICE's field offices through various forms of
cooperation or noncooperation. Then I turn to top-down pressure on ICE's
field offices from the President and leadership of DHS and ICE in
Washington, D.C.
A. Bottom-Up Influence of States and Localities
Immigration is often mentioned as an example of cooperative federalism
because the Immigration and Nationality Act allows states and localities to
help enforce immigration laws, with federal supervision. 90 Under the
conventional view of cooperative federalism, states are perceived as the
subordinated agents of the federal government. 91 Because the federal
government utilizes states (or localities) to enforce federal law, this
relationship can be perceived as undermining traditional notions of state
autonomy. 92 Additionally, "voluntary state or local cooperation" can easily
turn into "involuntary commandeering" in an area like immigration, where
the federal government has long enjoyed great deference from the courts. 93
90.

See Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Federalism as a Safeguard of the Separation of Powers, 112

&

COLUM. L. REV. 459, 472 (2012) (explaining that cooperative federalism schemes commonly "preserve
a significant role for the federal executive even when they empower the states"); Philip J.
Weiser, Towards a ConstitutionalArchitecture for Cooperative Federalism,79 N.C. L. REv. 663, 672
(2001); DANIEL J. ELAZAR, AMERICAN FEDERALISM: A VIEW FROM THE STATES 162 (2d ed. 1972)
(proposing that the states and the federal government have a web of cooperative relationships through
the federalist system); Larry D. Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1544,
1554 (1994) (discussing how working alliances form between federal and state counterparts).
See David S. Rubenstein, Administrative Federalism as Separation of Powers, 72 WASH.
91.
LEE L. REv. 171, 193 (2015) ("Because of that subordination, the autonomy model does not neatly
capture cooperative-federalism arrangements.").
92.
See Kramer, supra note 90, at 1544; Weiser, supra note 90, at 672; Scott A. Keller, How
Courts Can ProtectState Autonomyfrom FederalAdministrative Encroachment, 82 S. CAL. L. REv. 45,

58 (2008); Margaret H. Lemos, State Enforcement of Federal Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. REv. 698 (2011)
(discussing various contexts where Congress calls on states to enforce federal law); Keith CunninghamParmeter, ForcedFederalism:States as Laboratoriesof Immigration Reform, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1673,
1685 (2011) ("In theory, states working under an agreement with [ICE] should be able to serve federally
defined goals while developing unique enforcement techniques based on local expertise."); BulmanPozen, supra note 90, at 472 (explaining that cooperative federalism schemes commonly "preserve a
significant role for the federal executive even when they empower the states").
93.
Toni M. Massaro & Shefali Milczarek-Desai, Constitutional Cities:SanctuaryJurisdictions,
Local Voice, and Individual Liberty, 50 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 1, 41 (2018) (explaining that "the
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Administrative federalism, which "features agencies, rather than Congress,
as the primary deciders of where to draw lines between federal and state
authority," 94 recognizes that federal agencies make crucial decisions "about
the actual scope of state powers and autonomy." 95
On the other hand, Professors Jessica Bulman-Pozen and Heather
Gerken assert an alternative view of states exerting substantial power in
arrangements where they administer a federal program or enforce federal
law. 96 They reason that the federal government depends on states in these
types of relationships, so states have "leverage" and "discretion in choosing
how to accomplish [their] tasks and which tasks to prioritize."97 According
to Professor Bulman-Pozen, states engaged in cooperative federalism can
operate as a check on the Executive Branch because they can "diverge from
federal executive policy, curb the federal executive's own implementation
98
of the law, or goad the federal executive to take particular actions."
Professors Bulman-Pozen and Gerken specifically mention immigration as
an example of what they call "uncooperativefederalism," where "states use
regulatory power conferred by the federal government to tweak, challenge,
and even dissent from federal law." 99
States and localities can influence federal immigration enforcement
through multiple forms of cooperation or noncooperation. First, Congress
has authorized states to be involved in enforcing immigration laws through
section 287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.1 00 This statutory
provision allows the executive to deputize state or local law enforcement
officers to perform immigration functions related to "investigation,
apprehension, or detention of aliens in the United States."' 0' There are three
different models that law enforcement agencies have followed in
implementing 287(g) agreements: (1) a jail enforcement model, where local
law enforcement officers identify individuals in jail who have been charged
or
state
voluntary
and
commandeering
involuntary
between
line
local cooperation with federal authorities is elusive" and that "[t]hese complexities mount when
immigration laws are involved" due to judicial deference).
94.
Rubenstein, supra note 91, at 197; see also Miriam Seifter, States, Agencies, and Legitimacy,

67 VAND. L. REV. 443, 445-46 (2014) (describing administrative federalism and the power it gives
agencies).

95.

Gillian E. Metzger, Federalism Under Obama, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 567, 570 (2011).

96.

Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J.

1256, 1265 (2009).
Id. at 1266.
97.
Bulman-Pozen, supra note 90, at 478 (emphasis omitted).
98.
99.
100.

Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 96, at 1259 (emphasis added); see also id. at 1281.
8 U.S.C. § 1357(g); see also Margaret H. Lemos, State Enforcement of Federal Law, 86

N.Y.U. L. REV. 698 (2011) (describing how Congress involves states in enforcing federal laws in various
contexts).

101.

8 U.S.C. § 1357(g).
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with or convicted of crimes for removal; (2) a task force model, where local
law enforcement officers identify removable individuals in the community
during the course of their regular duties; and (3) a hybrid model that
combines the two.102
All 287(g) agreements between the federal government and state or local
law enforcement agencies require supervision by ICE. 0 3 However, a 2009
GAO report documented "wide variation" in the nature and extent of ICE
field offices' supervisory responsibility over the implementation of 287(g)
programs.104 GAO found that lack of controls made it difficult for ICE to
ensure that the program was being operated as intended. For example,
although the program was intended to address "serious crime," GAO found
that four out of the twenty-nine program participants reviewed were using
287(g) authority to process individuals for "minor crimes, such as speeding,
contrary to the objective of the program."1 05 ICE subsequently modified the
template for its 287(g) agreements to address GAO's concerns: for example,
by specifying ICE's enforcement priorities and describing ICE's
supervision role with greater specificity. However, the Migration Policy
Institute found that the new template did not have any "substantial effect on
287(g) priority setting, program operations, ... or community impacts." 06
As Professor Huyen Pham has explained, "decisions about enforcement
priorities continued to be made at the sub-federal levels, driven by local
political pressures."1 07 Such variation in how law enforcement agencies
exercise their delegated authority under section 287(g) can result in regional
disparities in immigration enforcement. Although President Obama
curtailed 287(g) agreements, dozens of new agreements were established
under President Trump.10'

102. Huyen Pham, 287(g) Agreements in the Trump Era, 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1253, 126364 (2018); Ryo & Peacock, supra note 22, at 70.
103. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g). Although this section of the INS still references the Attorney General, in
2003, the authority to enforce immigration laws vested in the Secretary of the Department of Homeland
Security, who may delegate such authority to any official, officer, or employee of DHS. See 8 C.F.R.

§

2.1 (2021).
104.

U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-09-109, IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT: BETTER

CONTROLS NEEDED OVER PROGRAM AUTHORIZING STATE AND LOCAL ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL

IMMIGRATION LAws 4 (2009), https://www.gao.gov/assets/290/285583.pdf
TFKU].

105.
106.

Id.

108.

See id. at 1253-56.

[https://perma.cc/9N2N-

RANDY CAPPS, MARC R. ROSENBLUM, CRISTINA RODRIGUEZ & MUZAFFAR CHISHTI,
MIGRATION POL'Y INST., DELEGATION AND DIVERGENCE: A STUDY OF 287(G) STATE AND LOCAL
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT 3 (2011), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/287g-divergence.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HK5F-J95v].
107. Pham, supra note 102, at 1269.
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Another way that state and local law enforcement agencies can
voluntarily cooperate with ICE is through the Criminal Alien Program
(CAP), which allows federal immigration officers to screen people in jails
and prisons to identify potentially removable noncitizens.109 CAP officers
can issue a notice to the law enforcement agency asking to be informed prior
to an individual's release so that ICE can take custody, or they can issue an
"immigration detainer" requesting the facility to hold the individual for an
additional forty-eight hours to allow ICE to take custody.1 0
Many local law enforcement agencies have decided not to cooperate
with ICE by refusing to enter into 287(g) agreements, blocking access to
jails, or refusing detainer requests."' However, ICE can still access
information about noncitizens booked into the local jails through a program
called Secure Communities. Established by the George W. Bush
Administration, Secure Communities was revitalized and then deactivated
by President Obama in 2013,12 and it was then reinstated by President
Trump in 2017.13 Secure Communities electronically links local jails to
databases maintained by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and DHS
so that the fingerprints of individuals booked into local jails are
automatically sent to the FBI and DHS in order to identify potentially

109.

Criminal Alien Program, ICE

(Sep.

16, 2021), https://www.ice.gov/identify-and-

arrest/criminal-alien-program# [https://perma.cc/G8ZT-PA32].
110. See 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(d) (2021); AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, THE CRIMINAL ALIEN PROGRAM
(CAP):

IMMIGRATION

ENFORCEMENT

IN

PRISONS

AND

JAILS

5

(2013),

https://www.amcricanimmigrationcounci l.org/sites/default/files/research/capfact_shcet_8-I _fin_0.pdf

[https://perma.cc/QZW7-CTBW].
111.

Kate

Evans, Immigration Detainers, Local Discretion, and State Law's Historical

Constraints,84 BROOK. L. REv. 1085, 1089-90 (2019). In March 2017, the Trump administration issued
a new detainer policy designed to increase compliance by addressing constitutional concerns around
detainers. This new policy created a single detainer form that asserts probable cause and states that the

detainer is cancelled if ICE does not take custody within forty-eight hours. Id. at 1096.
112.

The Obama Administration replaced Secure Communities with the Priority Enforcement

Program. See Memorandum from Jeh Johnson, Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., to Thomas S.
Winkowski
et
al.,
Acting
Dir.,
ICE
(Nov.
20,
2014),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_secure_communities.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7CKW-45HW]. See also Christopher N. Lasch, Rendition Resistance, 92 N.C. L. REv.
149, 207-08 (2014) (describing Secure Communities under Obama); Juliet P. Stumpf, D(e)volving
Discretion: Lessons from the Life and Times of Secure Communities, 64 AM. U. L. REv. 1259, 1260
(2015) (arguing that the devolution of discretion that occurred through Secure Communities will be
difficult to undo through the Priority Enforcement Program); Hiroshi Motomura, The Discretion that

Matters: Federal Immigration Enforcement, State and Local Arrests, and the Civil-Criminal Line,
58 UCLA L. REV. 1819, 1858 (2011) (arguing that federal policies like Secure Communities that allow
state and local governments to decide who to expose to federal immigration enforcement by exercising
discretion over arrests risks abdicating federal authority over immigration).

113.

Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,799, 8,801 (Jan. 30, 2017) (terminating the Priority

Enforcement Program and reinstating Secure Communities).
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removable noncitizens." 4 Since state and local law enforcement agencies
cannot opt out of Secure Communities, this program limits their ability to
prevent noncitizens in their communities who have entered the criminal
justice system from getting funneled into the removal system." 5
A third way that local governments can cooperate with ICE is by entering
into a contract with ICE, called an Intergovernmental Service Agreement
(IGSA), to detain apprehended noncitizens for ICE in city or county jails." 6
Under these agreements, ICE pays the locality a set amount per day for each
person detained. Local governments can then decide to subcontract out
detention operations to a private correctional company, allowing ICE to
avoid the more complicated bidding procedures required to contract directly
with a private company. An empirical analysis of immigration detention in
county jails by Professors Emily Ryo and Ian Peacock found that between
1983 and 2013, "[t]he most substantial rise occurred in the South, followed
by the Midwest and the West," while "the Northeast remained relatively flat
over the years."" 7 They further found that, "[w]ithin regions, a large share
of the growth was concentrated within a relatively small number of states.
By 2013, approximately half of all counties holding ICE detainees were in
just ten states .... "18
States and localities can also resist cooperating with ICE by terminating
these IGSA contracts. For example, the cities of Adelanto, California and
Williamson County, Texas both terminated IGSAs after reports of abhorrent
conditions related to medical and mental health care, sexual abuse, and
family separations." 9 At the state level, California banned new private
114.

Secure Communities, ICE

(Feb.

9,

2021),

https://www.ice.gov/secure-communities

[https://perma.cc/2vDG-DSCG].
115. ICE initially presented Secure Communities as a "voluntary" program but by October 2010,
ICE acknowledged that the program was mandatory because it involved information sharing between
federal agencies. See Christine Cimini & Doug Smith, An Innovative Approach to Movement Lawyering:

An Immigrant Rights Case Study, 35 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 431, 484 (2021) (discussing the confusion
created by ICE's conflicting messaging about whether participation in Secure Communities was
voluntary); Jennifer M. Chac6n, Immigration Federalism in the Weeds, 66 UCLA L. REv. 1330, 1343
(2019) (noting that DHS instructed certain counties that opting out of Secure Communities was not an

option, leading those jurisdictions to find other paths of resistance such as declining to comply with ICE
detainer requests).

116.

See 8 U.S.C.

§ 103(a)(1l)(A)

(authorizing DHS to contract with state or local government

agencies "for necessary clothing, medical care, necessary guard hire, and the housing, care, and security

of persons detained by [ICE]").
117.

Ryo & Peacock, supra note 22, at 84.

118. Id. The ten states are: "Texas (107 counties holding ICE detainees), Georgia (45), North
Carolina (35), California (34), Florida (28), Kentucky (25), Virginia (24), Wisconsin (22), Indiana (22),
and Colorado (20)." Id.
119. Lora Adams, State and Local Governments Opt Out of Immigration Enforcement, CTR. FOR
2019),
(July
25,
AM.
PROGRESS
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/immigration/news/20

19/07/25/472535/state-local-

governments-opt-immigrant-detention/ [https://perma.cc/CE5G-UZ8Y].
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detention contracts or expanding existing ones; Michigan blocked the sale
of a former state prison that would have become a privately operated
immigration detention center; and Illinois banned private immigration
detention centers altogether. 2 0 These actions at the state and local level aim
to curtail the number of people in immigration detention by making it harder
for ICE to find detention facilities and operators.
Whether a state or locality resists or cooperates with immigration
enforcement in the ways described above is usually the basis for being
labeled either a "sanctuary" or "antisanctuary." 121 It is important to
remember, however, that there is no single definition of a "sanctuary" or
"antisanctuary" state or locality, and that a wide range of subfederal laws,
not just policies directly related to criminalization and immigration
enforcement, affect the political climate regarding immigrants. State and
local laws impacting immigrants' ability to obtain health care, social
services, identification documents, employment and professional licenses,
education, housing, and language access collectively help establish an
inclusive or exclusive climate for immigrants that may exert political
pressure on ICE.
The reality is that most states have a mix of inclusive and exclusive
policies. Even neighboring localities may have different stances towards
immigrants. But researchers in different fields have found ways to try to
quantify the overall effects of inclusive and exclusive policies. One detailed
typology is The Immigrant Climate Index (ICI), developed by Professors
Huyen Pham and Pham Hoang Van, which assigns a score to every state
that reflects the political climate for immigrants in that state based on
legislation enacted at the state and local levels from 2005 to 2020.122 The
ICI classifies laws affecting all of the areas noted above into four weighted
tiers to capture the overall climate for immigrants, with a higher positive
score denoting a more hospitable climate and a lower negative score
denoting a more hostile climate.
A similar, but cruder, analysis by two professors of public health, Dr.
Maria-Elena De Trinidad Young and Dr. Steven P. Wallace, summed the
total number of criminalization and integration policies separately for each
state and came up with a typology of four policy contexts: "high integration,
120.

Id.

See Cuison Villazor & Gulasekaram, supra note 15; Wiebe, supra note 20.
Huyen Pham & Pham Hoang Van, The Immigrant Climate Index, BAYLOR UNIV.
[https://perma.cc/NA2C-QXNJ];
https://sites.baylor.edu/vanpham/the-immigrant-climate-index-ici/
121.

122.

see also Huyen Pham & Pham Hoang Van, Subfederal Immigration Regulation and the Trump Effect,
94 NYU L. REV. 125 (2019); Huyen Pham & Pham Hoang Van, Measuringthe Climatefor Immigrants:
A State-by-State Analysis, in STRANGE NEIGHBORS: THE ROLE OF STATES IN IMMIGRATION LAW

(Gabriel Jack Chin & Carissa Hessick eds. 2014).
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low criminalization (eighteen states); high integration, high criminalization
(thirteen states); low integration, high criminalization (sixteen states); and
low integration, low criminalization (four states)."1 23 States in the first
category (high integration, law criminalization) are the most hospitable to
immigrants, while those in the third category (low integration, high
criminalization) are the most hostile.
Part IV below, which categorizes certain ICE offices as located in either
"sanctuary" or "antisanctuary" locations, draws on these efforts to assess
the cumulative impact of subfederal policies. As discussed further in Part
IV, in regions composed of multiple states that are especially hospitable or
hostile to immigrants, one might expect either a dampening or amplifying
effect on federal enforcement due to the political pressure exerted by states
and localities on ICE field offices. Before turning to the empirical analysis,
however, it is necessary to understand the political pressure exerted in the
other direction by the federal government.
B. Top-Down Impact of CentralPolicies
While states and localities exert bottom-up pressure on ICE field offices,
the President, the Secretary of DHS, and the Director of ICE exert top-down
pressure through regulations, guidance documents, and internal agency
procedures. Top-down forces can "resolve discrepancies taking place on the
ground and [] ensure that immigration policy achieves the goals set by those
both responsible and accountable for making across-the-board
decisions."1 24 However, there are at least two major challenges in ensuring
that central policies are implemented as intended: bureaucratic buy-in and
field office discretion. Additionally, it is important to recognize that the
federal government can drive regional differences through decisions about
where detention centers are located, whether detention center contracts
include a "guaranteed minimum" number of beds, and how resources are
allocated among ERO field offices.
1. BureaucraticBuy-In
As Professor Jennifer Chac6n has observed, in the last two years of his
administration, President Obama "made a number of high-profile efforts to
reduce some of the wild local variability and punitive excesses of

123. Maria-Elena De Trinidad Young & Dr. Steven P. Wallace, Included, but Deportable: A New
PublicHealth Approach to Policiesthat CriminalizeandIntegrateImmigrants, 109 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH
1171, 1173 (2019).
124.

Landau, supra note 19, at 1234.
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immigration enforcement." 25 These efforts, which included setting forth
clear immigration enforcement priorities and encouraging the use of
prosecutorial discretion, were met with resistance by many ICE officers. For
example, "ICE officers in Houston publicly contested [ICE Director]
Morton's prosecutorial discretion policy. ... "126 The National Immigration
and Customs Enforcement Council, which represented 7,700 of ICE's
20,000 employees at that time, went so far as to vote no confidence in ICE
Director Morton.1 27
Professors Marjorie S. Zatz and Nancy Rodriguez stress that "[t]he slow
and, at best, uneven, response to the Morton Memos across jurisdictions was
noted by many."' 28 They point out that a survey of immigration attorneys
conducted by the American Immigration Lawyers Association and the
American Immigration Council found that "in the majority of offices ICE
agents, trial attorneys and supervisors admitted that they had not
implemented the memoranda and there had been no changes in policy or
practice."'129

Tensions between DHS leadership and ICE field offices heated up again
immediately after the new policy of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals
(DACA) went into effect. A group of ICE officers, including the President
of the National Immigration and Customs Enforcement Council, Chris
Crane, sued to stop DACA from being implemented.1 30 Another lawsuit was
brought in 2014 by the supervising attorney of ICE's Phoenix Field Office,
also challenging the guidance on prosecutorial discretion, reflecting
"continued tensions within the agency's ranks over the appropriate use of
prosecutorial discretion in deportation proceedings."' 3 ' Although these
lawsuits were not successful, they reflect overt rejection of central policies
by ICE officers.

125. Chacbn, supra note 13, at 1349.
126. Marjorie S. Zatz & Nancy Rodriguez, The Limits of Discretion: Challenges and Dilemmas
ofProsecutorialDiscretion in Immigration Enforcement, 39 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 666, 677 (2014).
127. Id. at 677-78.
128. Id. at 680.
129. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting AM. IMMIGR. LAWS. ASS'N, HOLDING DHS ACCOUNTABLE
ON PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION (2011)).

130. Id. at 677; Crane v. Napolitano, No. 12-CV-03247-0, 2013 WL 8211660 (N.D. Tex. July 31,
2013) (dismissing lawsuit brought by Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents challenging
new immigration initiatives for lack of standing), aff'd sub nom, Crane v. Johnson, 783 F.3d 244 (5th
Cir. 2015).
131. Jason A. Cade, Enforcing Immigration Equity, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 661, 693 n.204 (2015)
(citing Julia Preston, Suit Previews Turmoil That Immigration Overhaul May Cause Its Enforcers, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 12, 2014, at A21).
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2. Field Office Discretion
Besides the problem of bureaucratic buy-in, central policies can fail to
promote uniformity if they leave too much discretion to field offices. For
example, the Trump Administration's executive order addressing
immigration enforcement in the interior of the country failed to designate
any clear priorities, giving ICE officers wide discretion in deciding who to
arrest, detain, and deport. 32 The Biden Administration's prosecutorial
discretion memorandum dated September 30, 2021 provides more guidance
than Trump's executive order did, as it delineates three major priority
categories (threats to national security, threats to public safety, and threats
to border security) and provides a list of mitigating factors. However, ICE
field offices still have wide discretion in any given case.1 33
3. Allocation of Resources and Decisions about Detention Facilities
The federal government itself can also drive regional differences through
decisions about how to allocate resources among field offices. For example,
in its Fiscal Year (FY) 2019 annual report, ICE stated that the "sustained
increase in migration" that year required ERO to "redirect its enforcement
personnel and detention capacity to support border enforcement efforts as
well as a significantly increased detained population."" 4 According to the
report, this "negatively impacted the number of ERO' s interior arrests, as
well as the percentage of removals stemming from such arrests." 3 5 In FY
2019, ERO reassigned 350 officers to Southwest Border operations.' 3 6 That
number increased in FY 2021, when "ERO had up to 1,000 of its 6,228
officers supporting Southwest Border efforts, roughly one sixth of the
operational workforce."37
132.

Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799, 8801

§

13 (Jan. 30, 2017); see also

Chac6n, supra note 13, at 1350 ("If 2014-2016 was a period of increasingly centralized control over
immigration enforcement discretion, the period from 2017 to the present is largely characterized by
federal immigration enforcement initiatives aimed at decentralizing and diffusing immigration
enforcement discretion.").

133. Memorandum from Alejandro N. Mayorkas, Sec'y, Dep't Homeland Sec., to Tae D. Johnson,
Acting Dir., ICE (Sep. 30, 2021), https://www.ice.gov/doclib/news/guidelines-civilimmigrationlaw.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9ZNX-BVBB].
134. U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF'T, FISCAL YEAR 2019 ENFORCEMENT AND REMOVAL
OPERATIONS REPORT 3, [hereinafter ICE FY 2019 ENFORCEMENT AND REMOVAL OPERATIONS REPORT]
https://www.ice.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Document/2019/eroReportFY2019.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5K4X-G8WW].
135. ICE FY 2019 ENFORCEMENT AND REMOVAL OPERATIONS REPORT, supra note 134, at 3.
136. Id. at 12.
137. ICE ANNUAL REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2021, supra note 80, at 11. The creation of a new field
office in Harlingen, Texas, in 2021 was part of this response to increased migration along the Southwest

Border. Id. at 8.
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Shifting resources to the Southwest Border impacts not only arrests, but
also the makeup of the detained population. CBP arrests migrants within
100 miles of the border, most of whom have no criminal history but are
subject to mandatory detention under the INA.1 38 By contrast, the vast
majority of arrests by ERO in the interior involve individuals with a pending
criminal charge or a conviction.1 39 When ERO shifts resources from
arresting people in the interior to detaining individuals arrested by CBP,
0
more of the detained population will have no criminal history.14
Decisions by DHS/ICE leadership about where to locate detention
centers also exerts top-down pressure on field offices. States and localities
play an important role in deciding whether to participate in immigration
detention, as discussed above, but the federal government can also make
strategic decisions to seek out locations for detention facilities that serve its
interests. For example, the concentration of detained individuals in
Louisiana and Texas is advantageous to ICE for several reasons,
including:141 the proximity to Mexico and Central America facilitates
removals; harsh immigration judges deny the vast majority of asylum
cases; 42 federal district courts rarely grant habeas petitions filed by
noncitizens challenging their detention; '43 and cases are in the jurisdiction
of the Fifth Circuit, a conservative court.'4 Detention is therefore an area
where bottom up and top down pressures converge.
The federal government's contractual agreements with detention facility
owners and operators may amplify the pressure to detain. In particular,
many detention facility contracts include "mandatory minimums," meaning
138.

139.
140.
Id. at 6.
141.
Louisiana,

ICE FY 2019 ENFORCEMENT AND REMOVAL OPERATIONS REPORT, supra note 134, at 3.

Id.
Id. at 3, 6, 12. In FY 2019, 63% of the detained population was initially apprehended by CBP.
In FY 2019, ICE's average daily detained population was 16,567 in Texas and 6,171 in
making these the two states with the largest numbers of individuals in ICE custody. ICE FY

19 Detention Statistics (on file with author).

142. See Judge-by-Judge Decisions in Immigration Courts: FY 2016-2021, TRAC IMMIGR.
[https:/perma.cc/J4GZ(2021) https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/judge2021/denialrates.html
PJBB] (showing denial rates greater than 90% among many judges in the Jena and Oakdale Immigration
Courts, which handle detained cases in Louisiana).

143. TULANE UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOL IMMIGRANT RIGHTS CLINIC, NO END IN SIGHT:
PROLONGED AND PUNITIVE DETENTION OF IMMIGRANTS IN LOUISIANA 12 (2021),
https://law.tulane.edu/sites/law.tulane.edu/files/TLS%20No%2End%201n%2Sight%20Single%20Pa
gcs%20FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/CJ9J-9BQB] (examining habeas petitions filed by noncitizens in
the Western District of Louisiana over a ten-year period and finding that the court ordered release in less
than 1% of cases, although ICE decided to release the petitioner in 22% of cases after a habeas was

filed).
144. See Ramji-Nogales, Schoenholtz & Schrag, supra note 23, at 362, tbl.2 (finding that the
Fifth Circuit remanded only 2.4% of asylum and related cases); Jess A. Velona, PartisanImbalance on
the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 89 JUDICATURE 25, 31 (2005) (finding that the chance of getting an allRepublican panel was 50 times higher in the Fifth Circuit than in two other circuits in 2005).
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ICE must pay a per diem for a certain number of beds regardless of whether
they are filled. Some field offices, like San Antonio and New Orleans, have
over 6,000 "guaranteed minimum" beds, while others have none.1 4 5
Knowing that the federal government must pay for a certain number of beds
may lead to transfers to locations with high numbers of guaranteed
minimums and put pressure on field offices to keep those beds filled. States
and localities that include guaranteed minimums in their contractual
agreements with ICE are also exerting pressure on field offices in this
situation, so bottom-up as well as top-down forces are involved.
In sum, decisions made by DHS leadership about how to allocate
resources and how to handle detention can impact the way that field offices
approach arrests and detention. It is difficult to disentangle the impact of
these decisions by DHS leadership from the role of discretion by field
offices. However, the data discussed in Part III below show variations
across all field offices, not just those that oversee the Southwest Border or
large detained populations, suggesting that discretion does play an
important role.
C. Regional Effects
ICE field offices are where these bottom-up and top-down pressures
converge. Although all ICE field offices are supposedly enforcing the same
body of federal laws, there are many reasons why differences may emerge
besides those discussed above. First, ICE's field offices are physically,
socially, and politically rooted in localities and states. As Dave Owen has
argued, federal officials can be influenced by the "awareness that comes
from geographic proximity,"146 since many of them "live in the areas where
they work, and have often done so for decades, if not their entire lives."1 47
Second, ICE's dependence on state and local cooperation can lead to "a
continuous process of. . . negotiation" with state and local governments.' 4 8
As a result of these negotiations, federal immigration enforcement may look
different in different parts of the country. ICE's field offices may serve as
mediators "by bridging gaps and conflicts between Washington and the

145.

ICE FY2019 Detention Statistics (on file with author). The data from FY2019 show that the

New Orleans field office had 6,415 guaranteed minimum detention beds in its jurisdiction and San

Antonio had 7,235, compared to an average of 1255. Several field offices including Boston, Chicago,
Dallas, New York City, and Salt Lake City, did not have any guaranteed minimums in their areas of

responsibility.
146.

Owen, supra note 7, at 73.

147.
148.

Id. at 108.

RONALD L. WArS, EXECUTIVE FEDERALISM: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 2-4 (1989);
Bulman-Pozen, supra note 6, at 973 (quoting WATTS, supra, at 3-4).
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regions over which they are responsible."' 4 9 Variations in enforcement
practices at the field office level may reflect these efforts to mediate
competing pressures.15 0
Third, as noted above, regional effects may emerge from the aggregate
effects that can occur when groups of states or localities exert pressure on
ICE field offices. Looking only at an individual state (or localities within a
state) fails to capture that impact. Professor Jennifer Chacon has noted that
"national data suggest that where a state's enforcement policies are aligned
with, rather than compete with, federal policies, federal enforcement efforts
will be amplified."' 5 A regional approach takes this analysis one step
further by examining the amplifying effects that may occur when multiple
states or localities are aligned with federal policies.
Fourth, as discussed above, decisions made by DHS/ICE leadership
about how to allocate resources, including personnel, among field offices
can produce regional differences. Likewise, decisions made by DHS/ICE
leadership about detention facility locations and contracts can influence
how field offices approach arrest and detention. To the extent that variations
resulting from these decisions by DHS/ICE leadership reflect the agency's
centralized goals, they should be distinguished from variations resulting
from factors outside the agency's control. But untangling the impact of
these different factors on field offices is difficult.
The empirical analysis presented below informs this discussion by
examining variations among ICE's field offices in key aspects of
immigration enforcement.

III. REGIONAL VARIATIONS IN IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT
This section analyzes data from FY 2019 to examine disparities among
ICE's twenty-four field offices in detainer requests, arrests, removals, the
use of detention, and the use of alternatives to detention. More recent data
from FY 2020 was not used because the COVID-19 pandemic affected
many aspects of immigration enforcement in ways that will likely be
temporary. State and county-level data on immigration detainers is
published by Transaction Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC) based at
Syracuse University. 5 2 This data was compiled based on the geographical
area of responsibility for each ICE field office in order to analyze
149.
150.
151.
152.

TJXH].

See Blank & Rosen-Zvi, supra note 7, at 1907.
For a thorough discussion of the merits and drawbacks of federal regions, see id. at 1943-66.
Chacon, supra note 13, at 1391.
See About Us, TRAC, https://trac.syr.cdu/aboutTRACgencral.html [https://pcrma.cc/5W7E-
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differences in detainer requests among field offices. 153 With respect to
arrests and removals, ICE publishes data that is already broken down by
field office, which ICE calls "local statistics."'5 4 ICE publishes detention
data by detention facility.. For FY 2019, ICE published data on 212
detention facilities, which were sorted and compiled by field office. 15' ICE
publishes data on alternatives to detention by field office.' 56
Because field offices are responsible for geographic regions with
immigrant populations of different sizes, rates are calculated based on the
number of detainers requested and the number of noncitizens arrested,
removed, and detained for every 1000 unauthorized individuals in the field
office's area of responsibility. Additionally, percentages are calculated
where appropriate to reflect how national numbers are distributed among
field offices, as well as to examine what proportion of a field office's arrests,
removals, and detentions involved noncitizens with a certain profile (e.g.,
no criminal history, conviction, pending charge).
The analysis below specifically examines and compares field offices in
sanctuary and antisanctuary regions. Sanctuary regions are those that
generally resist cooperation with ICE and have a more hospitable and
inclusive climate for immigrants, while antisanctuary regions are those that
cooperate with ICE and have a more hostile and exclusive climate for
immigrants. In order to categorize regions as sanctuary or antisanctuary, this
Article relies on maps created by organizations such as the Immigrant Legal
Resources Center.1 57 The Immigrant Climate Index (ICI) developed by
Professors Huyen Pham and Pham Hoang Van, which assigns a score to
every state's reflecting political climate for immigrants, is also a very useful
tool in assessing the climate for immigrants across multiple states.15 t More

153. The spreadsheet of compiled data is on file with author.
154. See
ERO
FY19
Local
Statistics,
https://www.ice.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Report/2019/ero-fy19-localstatistics.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6EX8-S4P5].

ICE,

ICE's FY 2019 detention statistics are on file with author.
Alternatives to Detention is included as one of the tabs in ICE's FY 2019 Detention Statistics.
For maps of sanctuary and antisanctuary states and localities, see National Map of Local
Entanglement with ICE, IMMIGRANT LEGAL RES. CTR. (Nov. 13 2019), https://www.ilrc.org/localenforcement-map [https://perma.cc/SCP9-WFNS]; Anti-Sanctuary States Map, FACING SOUTH,
[https://perma.cc/F738-PSBB];
https://www.facingsouth.org/files/anti-sanctuary-states-map-v3png
Sanctuary Policy FAQ, NAT'L
CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATORS
(June 20,
2019),
155.
156.
157.

https://www.ncsl.org/research/immigration/sanctuary-policy-fa635991795.aspx
[https://perma.cc/7DPY-8ET2].
158.

Pham & Hoang Van, supra note 122; see also Huyen Pham & Pham Hoang Van, Subfederal

Immigration Regulation and the Trump Effect, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 125 (2019); Huyen Pham & Pham
Hoang Van, Measuring the Climate for Immigrants: A State-by-State Analysis, in STRANGE NEIGHBORS:
THE ROLE OF STATES IN IMMIGRATION LAW (Gabriel Jack Chin & Carissa Hessick eds., 2014).
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comprehensive tables that include data for all ERO field offices are included
in the Appendix.
The analysis below refers to the following seven field offices as being
located in sanctuary regions: Baltimore, Boston, Los Angeles, New York
City, Newark, San Francisco, and Seattle. The Seattle Field Office oversees
two sanctuary states, Washington and Oregon. The Boston Field Office
oversees four sanctuary states, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Vermont, and
Rhode Island. The other field offices in this category (Los Angeles, San
Francisco, Baltimore, Newark, and New York City) are composed of part
or all of a state where numerous localities have adopted sanctuary policies.
Data on the Chicago Field Office is often reported with data on these seven
field offices because Illinois is a sanctuary state and has, by far, the largest
undocumented population among the group of states overseen by that field
office, which may make it particularly influential.
The field offices that are considered located in antisanctuary regions are:
Atlanta, Dallas, Houston, Miami, New Orleans, Phoenix, and San Antonio.
The states of Texas, Florida, and Arizona all have state antisanctuary laws.
Because the El Paso Field Office oversees not only West Texas but also
New Mexico, which is not an antisanctuary state, it is not categorized as
being in an antisanctuary region. The San Diego Field Office is located in a
state with a sanctuary law, but it oversees only San Diego County and
Imperial County, and San Diego County joined the lawsuit challenging
California's sanctuary law. San Diego therefore is not included in either
category. In the jurisdiction of the New Orleans field offices, Mississippi,
Alabama, and Tennessee have antisanctuary laws, while Arkansas and
Louisiana do not. Given the extremely negative cumulative score of these
five states using the ICI developed by Professors Huyen Pham and Pham
Hoang Van, the New Orleans office is classified as located in an
antisanctuary region. 159 The Atlanta Field Office also oversees three states
that cumulatively have a highly negative score based on the ICI (Georgia,
North Carolina, and South Carolina) and is therefore placed in the
antisanctuary category. 160
159. The states overseen by the New Orleans field office had a cumulative ICI score of -182 at
the time of writing. The states scores utilized here were previously published online and are on file with
the author. At the time of publication, the state scores were being updated and not yet publicly available.

160.

The states overseen by the Atlanta field office had a cumulative ICI score of -179 at the time

of writing. After Arizona passed SB 1070 in 2010, an anti-immigrant statute that was partly struck down
as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, the states that immediately passed similar laws in 2011 were

Alabama (HB 56) (part of the New Orleans field office), Georgia (HB 87) and South Carolina (SB 20)
(both part of the Atlanta field office). See Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act,

S. 1070 (SB 1070), 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010), amended by H.R. 2162, 49th Leg., 2d Reg.
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One of the challenges of this approach is that two of the field offices in
antisanctuary regions (San Antonio and Phoenix) also oversee parts of the
Southwest Border. This makes it especially difficult to distinguish
variations related to the substantial resources they receive to support
operations along the Southwest Border from variations related to the
exercise of discretion and other factors. However, there are still five other
field offices in ansanctuary regions that are not in border regions, so one can
set aside the San Antonio and Phoenix field offices if one chooses and focus
on the other five. Additionally, not all of the variables examined below are
affected by proximity to the border. For example, detainer requests
generally pertain to individuals already in the United States who were
arrested for a crime, not migrants who recently crossed the border.
Using the data in the Appendix for all twenty-four field offices, one can
also compare field offices in sanctuary regions to field offices in the interior
of the country that do not fit in either the sanctuary or antisanctuary
categories. Comparisons of field offices in the interior that do not fit in
either category to each other also reveal disparities. While not knowing the
resources that each field office receives is still a limitation of the study, there
is no particular reason to think that field offices apart from those that oversee
major border crossing areas or especially large detained populations receive
resources disproportionate to their unauthorized population.
Overall, the analyses below demonstrate substantial variations among
field offices after taking the size of the unauthorized population into
account. Not only are there stark differences between field offices in
sanctuary and antisanctuary regions, but striking differences also exist
within each of these categories. The discrepancies regarding the arrest,
detention, and removal of noncitizens with no criminal history are
especially important since these areas involve the greatest exercise of
discretion by field offices, and the variations cannot be explained by the
decisions of state and local law enforcement agencies to cooperate or not
cooperate with ICE.

Sess. (Ariz. 2010); Beason-Hammon Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act, H.B. 56, No. 535,
2011 Ala. Laws 888 (codified as amended at ALA. CODE § 31-13-1 to - 35); Illegal Immigration
Reform and Enforcement Act of 2011, H.B. 87, No. 252, 2011 Ga. Laws 794 (codified in scattered
sections of GA. CODE ANN. tits. 13, 16, 17, 35, 36, 42, 45, 50); S.B. 20, No. 69, 2011 S.C. Acts 325
(codified in scattered sections of S.C. CODE ANN. tits. 6, 8, 16, 17, 23, 41).
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A. ICE DetainerRequests
Nationwide, ICE issued 165,768 detainer requests in FY 2019, and
information about location was available in 163,813 cases.' 61 About a
quarter of the detainer requests (39,268 or 24%) were in California, and 19%
(31,462) were in Texas. 6 2 Much of the discussion about detainers focuses
on California and Texas because the numbers there are so high. But looking
at detainer requests by field office, after taking the size of the undocumented
population into account, provides a more expansive view of geographic
disparities around the country.
Examining the number of detainer requests issued by each field office
per 1,000 undocumented individuals shows a wide range, from a rate of 6.2
by the New York City Field Office to 80.3 by the Buffalo Field Office.
Buffalo had, by far, the highest detainer request rate, as the field office with
the next highest number of detainer requests was New Orleans, with a rate
of 28.2. The Buffalo Field Office is unusual in that its area of responsibility
has a very small undocumented population (44,000) but includes a major
border crossing with Canada and a large detention center (Batavia). By
comparison, other field offices that oversee border areas (e.g. San Antonio,
El Paso, Phoenix, and San Diego) have much larger undocumented
populations. The Buffalo Field Office may therefore receive resources for
enforcement that are disproportionate to its undocumented population, and
it may feel pressure from headquarters to arrest and detain due to its
location. Upstate New York has also experienced a major increase in its
foreign born population during the past decade, including a large influx of
refugees, although the region remains predominantly non-Hispanic
White.1 63 This demographic shift could be leading to reactionary antiimmigrant backlash.M But taking a step back, the Buffalo Field Office was
161.

Latest Data: Immigration and Customs Enforcement Detainers, ICE Data Through June

2020, TRAC, https://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/detain/ [https://perma.cc/B5NW-6LAN].
162. Id. The next highest states were Florida (6% or 10,012), Georgia (5% or 8,524), New York
(5% or 8,506), and Arizona (4% or 5,878). At the local level, the jails that received the most detainer

requests were Harris County Jail in Texas (5,089), Maricopa County Jail in Arizona (2,910), Hidalgo
County Jail in Texas (2,451), Gwinnett County Jail in Georgia (2,321), and Dallas County Jail in Texas
(2,162). Id.
163. See OFFICE OF THE STATE COMPTROLLER, A PORTRAIT OF IMMIGRANTS IN NEW YORK 7
(2016),

https://www.osc.state.ny.us/files/reports/special-topics/pdf/economic-immigrants-2016.pdf

[https://perma.cc/WW4Y-QXEW]; New York State Population Topped 20 Million in 2020, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, NEW YORK: 2020 CENSUS (Aug. 25, 2021), https://www.census.gov/library/stories/state-bystate/new-york-population-change-between-census-decade.html (showing that counties in upstate New

York had Hispanic populations well below 10%).
164. See generally Daniel J. Hopkins, Politicized Places: Explaining Where and When
Immigrants Provoke Local Opposition, 104 AM. POL. SC. REv. 40 (2010) (concluding that "hostile
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responsible for only 2.2% of all detainer requests, so its overall role in
detainer requests remains quite small.
The average detainer request rate across field offices was 18.0 (or 15.3
if you exclude Buffalo as an outlier). Following Buffalo (80.3) and New
Orleans (28.2), the field offices with the highest rates of detainer requests
were San Antonio (25.0), St. Paul (21.7), Phoenix (20.9), Atlanta (20.3), El
Paso (19.6), and Philadelphia (18.8). Four of the eight field offices
comprising the top third in detention requests were in antisanctuary regions
(New Orleans, San Antonio, Phoenix, and Atlanta). It makes sense for there
to be a higher rate of detainer requests in antisanctuary regions, where the
requests are likely to be more effective due to cooperation by state and local
law enforcement. However, even among field offices in antisanctuary
regions, there is substantial variation in detainer requests. For example, the
New Orleans Field Office's rate of detainer requests was 40% higher than
that of the Phoenix Field Office.
Turning to the bottom third, the five field offices with the lowest rates of
detainer requests were all in sanctuary regions: New York City (6.2), Boston
(6.9), Baltimore (6.9), Newark (7.6), and Seattle (10.0). After Seattle was
the Chicago Field Office (10.5), which includes the sanctuary state of
Illinois. The two field offices in sanctuary regions that were not in the
bottom third were Los Angeles (14.1) and San Francisco (15.6). Looking at
variation among field offices in sanctuary regions, the Los Angeles Field
Office had a rate that was twice as high as the New York City, Boston, and
Baltimore field offices, and the San Francisco Field Office had a rate that
was twice as high as Newark's.
There are several possible reasons why ICE offices in five out of seven
sanctuary regions are requesting relatively low numbers of detainers. First,
if ICE officers know that a detainer request is going to be rejected, they may
decide there is no point in issuing a request. Alternatively, the attitudes of
the ICE officers may be influenced by state and local politics, making them
political reactions to neighboring immigrants are most likely when communities undergo sudden
influxes of immigrants and when salient national rhetoric reinforces the threat"); Benjamin J. Newman,
Acculturating Contexts and Anglo Opposition to immigration in the United States, 57 AM. J. PoL. SC.
374 (2012) (showing that "over-time growth in local Hispanic populations triggers threat and opposition
to immigration among whites residing in contexts with few initial Hispanics but reduces threat and

opposition to immigration among whites residing in contexts with large preexisting Hispanic
populations"); Ryan D. Enos, CausalEffect ofIntergroup Contacton ExclusionaryAttitudes, 111 PROC.
NATL. ACAD. SC. U.S.A. 3699 (2014) (demonstrating with a randomized controlled trial that even
minor demographic changes cause strong exclusionary effect); cf Eric Kaufmann & Matthew J.

Goodwin, The Diversity Wave: A Meta-Analysis of the Native-Born White Response to Ethnic Diversity,
76 Soc. SC. RES. 120 (2018) (concluding, based on 171 studies, that "higher diversity predict[s] threat
responses at the smallest and largest scales, whereas in units of 5000-10,000 people (such as tracts or

neighbourhoods), diversity is associated with reduced threat").
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less aggressive with enforcement in the form of detainer requests. Field
offices could also be intentionally mediating or negotiating the political
environment by moderating detainer requests. Another possibility is that
ICE's field offices in San Francisco and Los Angeles are retaliating against
those sanctuary regions or trying to send a message through more aggressive
use of detainers than field offices in other sanctuary regions. Regardless of
the explanation, there are clearly regional variations in ICE's practices
around detainer requests. Of note, the average detainer request rate among
field offices in antisanctuary regions was more than twice as high as the
average among those in sanctuary regions.
Table 2: Detainer Request Rates for Field Offices in Sanctuary and
Antisanctuary Regions in FY 2019. (Rates Represent the Number of
Detainer Requests for Every 1,000 Unauthorized Individuals in a Field
Office's Geographic Area of Responsibility).

Atlanta
Dallas

Detainer Request Rate
6.9
6.9
14.1
6.2
7.6
15.6
10
9.6
20.3
14.8

Houston
Miami

16.9
13.9

New Orleans
Phoenix

28.2
20.9

San Antonio
Andsanctuary Average

25
20

Field Office
Baltimore
Boston
Los Angeles
New York City
Newark
San Francisco
Seattle
Sanctuary Average
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B. AdministrativeArrests
In FY 2019, ICE's twenty-four field offices made a total of 143,099
administrative arrests. 165 Six out of the twenty-four field offices were
responsible for over 50% of these arrests, all of them in antisanctuary
regions: Dallas (11.8%), Atlanta (9.3%), San Antonio (8.4%), Houston
(8.2%), New Orleans (7.3%), and Miami (6.6%). The Los Angeles and San
Francisco field offices, which are responsible for the two areas with the
largest number of unauthorized individuals in the country, respectively
made only 4.7% and 3.6% of all arrests nationwide.
The average arrest rate (i.e., number of arrests per 1,000 undocumented
individuals) was 15.4, with a range from 3.1 by the New York City Field
Office to 29.0 by the New Orleans Field Office, nearly ten times as high.
The lowest arrest rates were by field offices in sanctuary regions: New York
City (3.1), Los Angeles (4.6), San Francisco (4.7), Baltimore (6.4), Boston
(6.7), Newark (6.8), and Seattle (7.1). These seven field offices in sanctuary
regions were the only ones with an arrest rate below 10, followed by the
Chicago Field Office (10.7).166 State and local policies regarding
cooperation or noncooperation with ICE therefore appear to impact
arrests. 167 Comparing sanctuary regions to each other, however, we still find
significant disparities. For example, the arrest rate by the Newark Field
Office is twice as high as the New York City Field Office.
The highest arrest rates were by the following field offices: New Orleans

(29.0), San Antonio (28.7), Buffalo (28.6), Dallas (24.6), St. Paul (23.6),
Philadelphia (21.9), Phoenix (21.0), and Salt Lake City (18.7). Looking at
regions with especially large undocumented populations to help put these
numbers into perspective, the Dallas Field Office had nearly twice the arrest
rate of Miami (13.0), the Phoenix Field Office (21.0) had twice the arrest
rate of Chicago (10.7), and the Atlanta Field Office (18.5) had over four
times the arrest rate of Los Angeles (4.5). Interestingly, several field offices

165.

ERO Administrative Arrests by Filed Office (Area of Responsibility) and Month, ICE,

9-localstatistics.pdf
https://www.ice.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Report/2019/ero-fyl
[https://perma.cc/MZ5Z-VK44]. Administrative Arrests include all ERO Programs. ERO Programs

include Detention and Deportation (DDP), Fugitive Operations (FUG), Alternatives to Detention (ATD),
Criminal Alien Program (CAP), Detained Docket Control (DDC), Non-Detained Docket Control

(NDD), Violent Criminal Alien Section (VCS), Joint Criminal Alien Response Team (JCT), Juvenile
(JUV), Law Enforcement Area Response (LEA), Mobile Criminal Alien Team (MCT), and 287(g). Id.
The total number of administrative arrests (143,099) includes 2,653 administrative arrests that were not

assigned to any field office. Id.
166.

The other states overseen by the Chicago Field Office have relatively small undocumented

populations, so Illinois is likely to be the most influential state in that group.
167.

Chacon, supra note 13, at 1380 (explaining that "noncooperation policies shape federal

enforcement outcomes").
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that are not in antisanctuary regions have relatively high arrest rates,
including St. Paul, Philadelphia, and Salt Lake City. These offices, along
with New Orleans, Dallas and Houston, also do not oversee border areas.
In addition to these overall arrest rates, it is helpful to examine the arrests
of noncitizens with no criminal history, those with convictions, and those
with a pending criminal charge. As noted above, differences in state and
local cooperation policies are most likely to affect arrests of individuals with
a conviction or pending charge, since the criminal justice system is where
state and local law enforcement agencies come into play. Variations in
arrests of individual with no criminal history have more to do with
differences in how field offices exercise discretion.
1. Arrests of Noncitizens with No CriminalHistory
Across all field offices, the average arrest rate of individuals with no
criminalhistory was 2.4, with a range from 0.3 for the Los Angeles Field
Office to 7.2 for San Antonio. The bottom four were all in sanctuary
regions-Los Angeles (0.3), San Francisco (0.4), New York City (0.5), and
Boston (0.6) -followed by Houston (1.0), Newark (1.0), Dallas (1.2), and
Salt Lake City (1.3). Two other sanctuary cities were ranked ninth and tenth:
Baltimore (1.4) and Seattle (1.5). These figures show that arrest rates of
noncitizens with no criminal history by field offices in sanctuary regions are
well below the average, undercutting the notion that failure to cooperate
with ICE will result in more people without a criminal history being
arrested.
Interestingly, although Dallas, Houston, and Salt Lake City all have high
overall arrest rates, ranking in the top third, when it comes to arrests of
noncitizens with no criminalhistory, they are in the bottom third, with lower
arrest rates than two sanctuary regions. Since Dallas and Houston are both
in Texas, an antisanctuary state, these figures suggest that factors other than
state sanctuary policies play an influential role when it comes to decisions
about arrests of noncitizens with no criminal history.
Turning to the field offices with the highest arrest rates of noncitizens
with no criminal history, the top third included: San Antonio (7.2), Buffalo

(6.5), Phoenix (4.3), Detroit (4.3), Philadelphia (4.1), El Paso (3.9), and
New Orleans (3.5). Only three of these are in antisanctuary regions (San
Antonio, Phoenix, and New Orleans). Again, there are obvious disparities
among field offices in antisanctuary regions, with the San Antonio Field
Office having an arrest rate seven times as high as Houston and six times as
high as Dallas. San Antonio's especially high arrest rate is likely related to
its role overseeing a long stretch of the Southwest Border and the additional

2022]

REGIONAL IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT

1629

resources that ICE deployed to this region to help apprehend recent
migrants.1 68 The same may be true of Buffalo, although Buffalo's extremely
high rate of detainer requests suggests that its arrests include a significant
number of individuals already in the United States who have been charged
with crimes, not just recent migrants.
Another way to look at this data is by the percentage of a field office's
arrests that involve noncitizens with no criminal history. Examining
percentages can help shed light on how a field office chooses to utilize its
resources. The average percentage of noncriminal arrests across all field
offices was 14.9%, with a range of approximately 5-25%. The two field
offices that arrested the lowest percentage of people with no criminal history
were Dallas (4.9%) and Houston (5.4%), and the two that arrested the
highest percentage with no criminal history were San Antonio (25.2%) and
El Paso (25.4%). The especially high rates by the San Antonio and El Paso
Field Offices are likely due, in part, to the large number of recent migrants
with no criminal history being arrested in those jurisdictions.
Looking at the percentage of noncriminal arrests in sanctuary regions
complicates the picture. The data demonstrate a large spread among field
offices in sanctuary regions with respect to the percentage of noncriminal
arrests. Three field offices in sanctuary regions ranked among the bottom
third in the percentage of noncriminal arrests: Los Angeles (7.1%), San
Francisco (8.9%), and Boston (9.2%). Two ranked in the middle third:
Newark (14.7%) and New York City (14.9%). And two ranked in the top
third, along with Chicago (20.8%): Seattle (20.5%) and Baltimore (21.3%).
Thus, the percentage of a field office's arrests involving noncitizens with
no criminal history varies significantly among sanctuary regions, even
though the arrest rates for noncitizens is low across field offices in sanctuary
regions.
2. Arrests of Noncitizens with Convictions
Across all field offices, the average arrest rate for convicted noncitizens
was 9.8, with a range from 1.9 for the New York City Field Office to 20.5
for Buffalo. The field offices in the bottom third consisted of all those in
sanctuary regions, followed by Chicago: New York City (1.9), Newark
(3.6), Baltimore (3.8), Boston (3.9), Los Angeles (4.0), San Francisco (4.0),

Seattle (4.9), and Chicago (6.3).
The field offices with the highest arrest rates of noncitizens with
convictions were Buffalo (20.5), Dallas (18.3), New Orleans (17.3), San
168.

See supra notes 134-137 and accompanying text.
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Antonio (15.9), St. Paul (15.8), Philadelphia (14.0), Salt Lake City (13.8),
and Houston (12.9). Only half of these field offices are located in
antisanctuary regions. These figures suggest that achieving a high rate of
arrests of noncitizens with convictions does not require an antisanctuary
law. Nor do antisanctuary laws necessarily correspond to very high rates of
arrests of individuals with convictions. For example, the field offices in
Phoenix (10.7) and Atlanta (11.2) are located in antisanctuary regions but
had arrest rates closer to the average of 9.8.
Another way to look at the data is to examine the percentage of a field
office's total arrests involving noncitizens with convictions. The average
percentage of noncriminal arrests was 64.5%, with a range of approximately
50-87%. In all but two of the field offices, 50-75% of noncitizens arrested
in FY 2019 had a criminal conviction. The two field offices that stand out
are Los Angeles and San Francisco, where, respectively, 87% and 84% of
arrested noncitizens have a conviction. These field offices demonstrate that
it is possible for a field office to focus primarily on criminal arrests in a
sanctuary region, even if overall arrest rates remain low compared to other
parts of the country. Other field offices with high percentages of arrests
involving noncitizens with convictions were Dallas (74.4%), Salt Lake City
(74.0%), Denver (72.3%), Buffalo (71.6%) and Houston (71.5%). The
Dallas, Houston, and Salt Lake City field offices all had low arrest rates of
noncitizens without a criminal history, ranking in the bottom third, but
maintained high arrest rates of noncitizens with convictions, ranking in the
top third.
3. Arrests of Noncitizens with Pending Charges
The average arrest rate for noncitizens with a pending charge was 3.2,
with a range from 0.29 in Los Angeles to 8.17 in New Orleans, twenty-eight
times as high. The five field offices with the lowest arrest rates of
noncitizens with pending charges were all in sanctuary regions-Los
Angeles (0.3), San Francisco (0.3), New York City (0.7), Seattle (0.8), and
Baltimore (1.3)-followed by Buffalo (1.6), San Diego (1.8), and Denver
(1.9). The two other field offices in sanctuary regions, Boston (2.2) and
Newark (2.2), ranked in the middle third but were still below average. At
the high end, six out of the eight field offices in the top third were in
antisanctuary regions: New Orleans (8.17), Phoenix (6.0), St. Paul (5.6),
San Antonio (5.5), Atlanta (5.5), Dallas (5.1), Houston (4.2), and
Washington, D.C. (3.0). Once again, there is variation among field offices
in sanctuary regions, as well as among field offices in antisanctuary regions.
For example, the Baltimore Field Office's arrest rate was four times as high
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Los Angeles's, and the New Orleans Field Office had an arrest rate twice as
high as Houston.

Table 3: Arrest Rates for Field Offices in Sanctuary and Antisanctuary Regions
in FY 2019. (Rates Represent the Number of Arrests for Every 1000 Unauthorized
Individuals in a Field Office's Geographic Area of Responsibility).
Field Office

Overall
Arrest Rate

Arrest Rate:
No Criminal
History

Arrest Rate:
Convicted

Arrest Rate:
Pending Charge

Baltimore
Boston
Los Angeles
New York City
Newark
San Francisco
Seattle
Sanctuary

6.4
6.7
4.6
3.1
6.8
4.7
7.1
5.6

1.4
0.6
0.3
0.5
1
0.4
1.5
0.8

3.8
3.9
4
1.9
3.6
4
4.9
3.7

1.3
2.2

18.5
24.6
18
13
29
21
28.7
21.8

1.8
1.2
1
1.6
3.5
4.3
7.2
2.9

11.2
18.3
12.9
7.6
17.3

5.5
5.1
4.2
38

10.7
15.9
134

6
5,5

0.3
0.7
2.2
0.3
0.8
1.1

average

Atlanta
Dallas
Houston
Miami
New Orleans
Phoenix
San Antonio
Andtsanctuary
average

8.2

5.5

C. Removals
There were 267,136 removals in FY 2019. One field office, San Antonio,
was responsible for nearly a quarter of all the removals in the country
(23.7%). San Antonio's exceptionally high removal rate is no doubt related
to the removal of recent migrants, since this field office oversees a long
stretch of the Southwest Border where crossings commonly occur. The
number of removals carried out by San Antonio was nearly double the
number of removals by Phoenix (12.6%), which also oversees part of the
Southwest Border. Following Phoenix are two other field offices situated
near the border, San Diego (8.8%), and El Paso (7.9%). Then come Houston
(7.2%), Dallas (5.6%), Atlanta (5.4%), and New Orleans (5.1%), none of
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which oversee a border area but all of which have large numbers of
detention beds (to collect people before deportation), are located in
antisanctuary regions, and are in the southern part of the United States,
which facilitates deportation to Mexico and Central America. Each of the
other field offices is responsible for only around 1-2% of the total number
of removals nationwide.
Extreme variations existed among field offices in removal rates, which
ranged from 3.5 in New York City to 154.2 in San Antonio,forty-five times
higher. The average was 35.6, but only six field offices had a removal rate
above the average because very high removal rates by just four field offices
with jurisdiction over border areas distorted the average: San Antonio
(154.2), El Paso (142.0), San Diego (125.6), and Phoenix (119.8). Setting
aside these Southwest Border locations with especially high removal rates,
the next highest were Buffalo (41.8), New Orleans (40.2), Houston (29.7),
and Detroit (21.8), tied with Dallas (21.8).
Looking only at field offices in antisanctuary regions, the removal rate
of the San Antonio Field Office was over three times the removal rate of
New Orleans (40.2), five times the removal rate of Houston (29.7), seven
times the removal rate of Dallas (21.8), and over eleven times the removal

rate of Miami (13.3).
Six field offices in sanctuary regions had the lowest removal rates: New
York City (3.4), Baltimore (4.2), San Francisco (4.7), Newark (5.8), Los
Angeles (5.9), and Boston (6.2), followed by Chicago (7.2). The variation
among them is relatively small compared to the variations among field
offices in antisanctuary regions noted above. But it is still notable that the
Chicago Field Office had over twice the arrest rate of the New York City

Field Office.
The sections below break down removals for noncitizens with no
criminal history, those with convictions, and those with a pending criminal
charge.
1. Removals of Noncitizens with No CriminalHistory
The removal rate of noncitizens with no criminal history ranged from 0.6
for the San Francisco Field Office to 79.0 for San Antonio, 132 times higher,
with an average of 12.6. The field offices with the highest removal rate of
noncitizens with no criminal history were: San Antonio (79.0), San Diego

(71.8), Phoenix (45.1), El Paso (25.9), Buffalo (12.8), New Orleans (12.6),
Detroit (8.5), and Houston (7.6).
The field offices with the lowest removal rates of noncitizens with no
criminal history were: San Francisco (0.6), Baltimore (1.1), New York City
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(1.2), Washington, D.C. (1.4), Boston (1.5), Chicago (1.5), Salt Lake City
(1.5), and Los Angeles (1.8) tied with Newark (1.8). Six of these field
offices are in sanctuary regions. But the Dallas Field Office (1.9), which is
an antisanctuary region, has a removal rate that was very close to Los
Angeles and Newark. The Seattle Field Office stood out as the only field
office in a sanctuary region that was not in the bottom ten, with a removal
rate of 4.7, which is eight times as high as San Francisco.
Shifting to the percentage of a field office's removals involving
individuals with no criminal history, the average was 27.8%, but ranged
from 8.8% in Dallas to 57% in San Diego. After Dallas, the field offices
with the lowest percentage of noncriminal removals were San Francisco
(12.9%), Salt Lake City (14.0%), St. Paul (14.4%), Washington, D.C.

(14.6%), El Paso (18.2%), Philadelphia (20.4%), and Chicago (20.8%).
Thus, none of the field offices in sanctuary regions except for San Francisco
were in the bottom third when looking at the percentage of removals
involving noncitizens with no criminal history, even though they had low
removal rates (i.e., number of removals for every 1,000 unauthorized
individuals in their geographical area of responsibility).
The field offices with the highest percentages of noncriminal removals
were San Diego (57.2%), San Antonio (51.2%), Detroit (39.1%), Seattle
(38.3%), Phoenix (37.6%), New York City (36.4%), Miami (32.6%), and
Newark (31.5%). The San Diego, San Antonio, and Phoenix Field Offices
likely remove large numbers of recent migrants with no criminal history due
to their location overseeing parts of the Southwest Border. For field offices
away that do not oversee the border, however, the percentage of noncriminal
removals may well reflect how the field office exercises discretion in using
its resources, rather than differences in the populations they encounter.
The spread among field offices in sanctuary regions is especially notable.
Three of the field offices in sanctuary regions (Seattle, New York City, and
Newark) were among the top third of all field offices in terms of the percent
of their removals that involved individuals with no criminal history. Three
other field offices in sanctuary regions were in the middle third: Boston
(23.6%), Baltimore (25.8%), and Los Angeles (29.9%). Their percentages
of noncriminal removals were comparable to certain field offices in
antisanctuary regions, such as Houston (25.1%), Atlanta (26.5%), and New
Orleans (31.2%). No field offices in sanctuary regions were among the
bottom third of field offices with the lowest percentage of noncriminal
removals.
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2. Removals of Noncitizens with Convictions
Turning to convicted noncitizens, the removal rate ranged from 1.7 for
the New York City Field Office to 108.7 for the El Paso Field Office, with
an average of 20.1. The highest removal rates for convicted noncitizens
were by El Paso (108.7), Phoenix (66.4), San Antonio (65.9), San Diego
(47.3), Buffalo (27.3), New Orleans (21.2), Houston (19.6), and Dallas
(17.2). Here, too, the field offices that oversee border regions had especially
high rates of removals. Since recent migrants usually don't have
convictions, as explained above, the high removal rates of convicted
individuals by field offices that oversee border areas may reflect decisions
by ICE to move convicted noncitizens to detention facilities in these regions
in preparation for deportation. Following the five field offices mentioned
above were Philadelphia (13.0), Atlanta (12.1), and St. Paul (11.2).
The field offices with removal rates for convicted noncitizens in the
bottom third included all of the field offices in sanctuary regions except
Seattle: New York City (1.7), Baltimore (2.3), Newark (2.9), Boston (3.3),
Los Angeles (3.9), and San Francisco (3.9), which were followed by
Chicago (4.9) and Miami (6.4). The Seattle Field Office's removal rate (6.8)
was not much higher than Miami's.
If we look at the percentage of a field office's removals involving
convicted noncitizens, the average was 60%, with a range of 37.7% to
83.3%. The field offices in the top third, with the largest percentage of
removals involving convicted noncitizens, were: San Francisco (83.3%),
Dallas (78.7%), El Paso (76.5%), Salt Lake City (73.7%), Washington, D.C.

(72.1%), Philadelphia (69.4%), Chicago (66.6%), and St. Paul (66.0%). The
San Francisco Field Office, located in a sanctuary region, tops the list,
followed closely by Dallas, located in an antisanctuary region. The other
field offices in the top third were neither in sanctuary nor antisanctuary
regions.
The middle and bottom third both included a mix of sanctuary and
antisanctuary regions. The field offices in the bottom third were San Diego
(37.7%), San Antonio (42.8%), Miami (48.4%), Newark (49.4%), Detroit
(49.9%), New York City (50.0%), Boston (52.8%), and New Orleans
(52.8%). Four of these field offices are in sanctuary regions (Newark, New
York City, and Boston), and three are in antisanctuary regions (San Antonio,
Miami, and New Orleans), with percentages that are very similar.
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3. Removal of Noncitizens with a Pending Criminal Charge
The removal rate of noncitizens with apendingcharge (not a conviction)
ranged from 0.18 for the San Francisco Field Office to 9.3 for the San
Antonio Field Office, fifty times higher, with an average of 2.7. All of the
sanctuary cities except Boston were in the bottom third-San Francisco
(0.18), Los Angeles (0.27), New York City (0.46), Seattle (0.70), Baltimore
(0.74), and Newark (1.1)-along with Atlanta (0.66), Chicago (0.84),
Washington, D.C. (1.3), and Salt Lake City (1.3). The top third, with the
highest rates, consisted of San Antonio (9.3), Phoenix (8.3), El Paso (7.5),
New Orleans (6.2), San Diego (6.4), St. Paul (3.2), Dallas (2.7), and Miami
(2.5), which includes five field offices in antisanctuary regions.
With respect to the percentage of a field office's removals involving
noncitizens with a pending criminal charge, the average was 10.9%, with a
range from 3.3% for the Atlanta Field Office to 23.7% for the Boston Field
Office. A mix of field offices located in sanctuary and antisanctuary regions
were in both the top third and the bottom third, suggesting that factors other
than the region's sanctuary status were driving field offices' decisions about
how much to focus on noncitizens with pending charges.169

169. The top third of field offices, with the highest percentages of removals involving individuals
with a pending charge, were: Boston (23.7%), Newark (19.1%), Miami (19.0%), St. Paul (19.0%),
Baltimore (17.9%), New Orleans (16.0%), New York City (13.6%), and Washington, D.C. (13.3%). The
bottom third, with the lowest percentages, were: Atlanta (3.3%), San Francisco (4.0%), Buffalo (4.0%),

Los Angeles (4.6%), San Diego (5.1%), El Paso (5.3%), Seattle (5.7%), and San Antonio (6.0%).
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Table 4: Removal Rates for Field Offices in Sanctuary and Antisanctuary
Regions in FY 2019. (Rates Represent the Number of Removals for Every 1000
Unauthorized Individuals in a Field Office's Geographic Area of Responsibility).

Field Office

Overall
Removal
Rate

Removal Rate:
No Criminal
History

Removal
Rate:
Convicted

Removal Rate:
Pending
Charge

Baltimore

4.2

1.1

2.3

0.7

Boston

6.2

1.5

3.3

1.5

Los Angeles

5.9

1.8

3.9

0.3

New York City

3.5

1.2

1.7

0.5

Newark

5.8

1.8

2.9

1.1

San Francisco

4.7

0.6

3.9

0.2

Seattle

12.2

4.7

6.8

0.7

Sanctuary

6.1

1.8

3.5

0.7

Atlanta

20.2

5.3

12.1

0.7

Dallas

21.8

1.9

17.2

2.7

Houston

29.7

7.5

19.6

2.5

Miami

13.3

4.3

6.4

2.5

New Orleans

40.2

12.6

21.3

6.4

Phoenix

119.8

45.1

66.4

8.3

San Antonio

154.2

79

65.9

9.3

Andsanctuary
Average

57.0

22.2

29.8

4.6

Average

.

D. Detention

Huge disparities also exist among ICE field offices with respect to the
size and profile of the detained population, as well as the use of ICE's
Alternatives to Detention (ATD) program."10 These are discussed below.
1. DetainedPopulation
The total average daily detained population in FY 2019 was 49,143. At
the extremes, the Baltimore Field Office oversaw an average daily detained
population of just 313, while the San Antonio field office oversaw an
170. Significant variations among field offices also exist in detention center conditions, but that
is beyond the scope of this Article. See U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., OFF. OF INSPECTOR GENERAL,
OIG-19-18, ICE DOES NOT FULLY USE CONTRACTING TOOLS TO HOLD DETENTION FACILITY
CONTRACTORS ACCOUNTABLE FOR FAILING TO MEET PERFORMANCE STANDARDS 12 (2019),
2
https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2019-0 /OIG-19-18-Janl9.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Y5T7-8YDY]; U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., IMMIGRATION DETENTION: ICE
SHOULD ENHANCE ITS USE OF OVERSIGHT DATA AND MANAGEMENT OF DETAINEE COMPLAINTS 18,
22, 27, 41 (2020), https://www.gao.gov/assets/710/708961.pdf [https://pcrma.cc/S9K8-GPUH]).
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average daily detained population of 7,769. Just five field offices oversaw
over half of all detained immigrants in the country: San Antonio (16%),
New Orleans (13%), Phoenix (8%), Houston (8%), and El Paso (7%). The
next highest was Atlanta (6%), and all other field offices had just 1-3% of
the nation's immigration detainees.
If we look at the detention rate for every 1,000 unauthorized individuals
within each field office's jurisdiction, the average is 6.5 with a range from
0.6 for the San Francisco Field Office to 22.3 for El Paso. The top four, with
the highest detention rates, were El Paso (22.3), San Antonio (18.9),
Phoenix (14.8), and New Orleans (18.2). The bottom four, with the lowest
detention rates, were all located in sanctuary regions: San Francisco (0.6),
New York City (1.3), Baltimore (1.4), and Los Angeles (1.5), followed by

Chicago (1.8).
Variation in detention numbers is not surprising, given that detention
beds are clustered in certain states such as Texas and Louisiana.17 1
Additionally, field offices responsible for areas along the U.S.-Mexico
border oversee especially large numbers of "arriving aliens" and "certain
other aliens" who recently entered the United States without inspection and
are generally subject to so-called "mandatory" detention under INA §
235(b).1 72 Although detention under this INA section is called mandatory,
ICE officers still have discretion to parole noncitizens (i.e. release them) in
"for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit."1 73 There is
no administrative or judicial review of parole decisions.
But there are also other unique pressures to detain on certain field offices
based on "guaranteed minimums," which, as explained above, refers to the
minimum number of beds that ICE is required to pay for under a contract
with a detention center operator, regardless of whether ICE fills those beds.
Nationwide, ICE's contracts included a total of 30,117 "guaranteed
minimums" in FY 2019. Of those, 7,235 (24%) were within the jurisdiction
of the San Antonio Field Office and 6,415 (21%) were within the
jurisdiction of the New Orleans Field Office. The San Antonio and New
171. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Detention: ICE Data Snapshots as of July 2019,
TRAC IMMIGRATION, https://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/detention/ [https://perma.cc/6FCU-

ZVQM] (showing that Texas and Louisiana are the states with the largest numbers of detained
immigrants).
172. An "arriving alien" means someone who seek admission at a port of entry or who is

interdicted at sea. 8 C.F.R. § 1001.1(q) (2021); see also INA § 235(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) (generally
requiring the detention of individuals seeking admission to the United States who appear subject to
removal, including those arriving at a port of entry). Although detention is generally mandatory under

INA § 235(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1), ICE still has authority under this statutory provision to parole
a noncitizen in "for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit." There is no administrative
or judicial review of the parole decision.

173.

INA § 235(b)(1), 8 U.S.C.

§

1225(b)(1).

1638

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 99:1593

Orleans Field Offices are therefore under unique pressure to keep people
detained (as well as to arrest in order to fill detention beds). The field offices
with the next highest numbers of guaranteed minimums are Atlanta (2,482
or 8%) and Phoenix (2,048 or 7%), which also have high arrest and
detention rates.
At the opposite end of the spectrum, several field offices had no
guaranteed minimums, including Boston, Chicago, Dallas, New York City,
and Salt Lake City. In theory, the absence of guaranteed minimums should
give these field offices greater freedom to exercise discretion to release
someone, or not to detain someone in the first place. However, if we look at
the detention centers with the highest percentages of discretionary detention
(i.e., detention that is not mandated by statute), the three field offices at the
top of the list are Chicago (44.9%), Salt Lake City (48.3%), and New York
City (50.4%). Additionally, Boston (33.2%) and Dallas (35.6%) are in the
top half and above the average of 30.8% nonmandatory detainees. Thus,
even field offices with no guaranteed minimums decide, as a matter of
discretion, to detain one-thirdto one-halfof their total detained population.
Given that the New York City Field Office is in a sanctuary region, it is
particularly surprising to find a high percentage of discretionary detention
there. Newark (41.2%) is another field office in a sanctuary region that has
a high percentage of discretionary detainees, and so does Chicago (44.9%).
For four other field offices in sanctuary regions, the percentage of detainees
not subject to mandatory detention is close to the average of 30.8%: Seattle
(29.0%), San Francisco (29.3%), Baltimore (31.9%), and Boston (33.2%).
Only one field office in a sanctuary region is below average: Los Angeles
(23.5%). These figures suggest that field offices in sanctuary regions are not
necessarily concentrating their resources on mandatory detainees.
2.. Detainees Classifiedas "No Threat"
Turning to the profile of detained individuals, there is significant
variation regarding both criminal history and threat level. ICE categorizes
detained individuals as "No Threat Level" if they have no conviction. If a
noncitizen has a conviction, ICE assigns them a "threat level" of 1, 2, or 3,
with level 1 being the "greatest threat."' 74 According to ICE, threat level is
based on the "criminality of the detainee, including the recency of the
criminal behavior and its severity."m

174.
175.

ICE FY 19 Detention Statistics (on file with author).
Id. at n.24.
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In total, there were 29,701 detainees classified as "no threat" in FY 2019.
Just four field offices were responsible for over halfof these detainees: San
Antonio (20.5%), New Orleans (15.1%), Phoenix (10.1%), and Houston
(7.8%). The high number of detainees without any convictions in these
jurisdictions is likely due, at least in part, to the large number of asylum
seekers who are subject to mandatory detention as "arriving aliens" if they
request asylum at a port of entry.1 76
The number of detainees classified as "no threat" for every 1000
undocumented individuals ranged from 0.2 in San Francisco to 14.8 in San
Antonio, with an average of 3.9. The field offices with the highest rate of
"no threat" detainees were: San Antonio (14.8), El Paso (13.3), New
Orleans (13.2), Phoenix (10.7), San Diego (8.1), Buffalo (6.4), and Denver
(3.8). Half of these are in antisanctuary regions (San Antonio, Phoenix, New
Orleans, and Houston). The field offices with the lowest numbers were San
Francisco (.2), New York City (0.4), Baltimore (0.6), Salt Lake City (0.6),
Chicago (0.7), and Los Angeles (0.8), followed by a four-way tie between
Boston, Dallas, Newark, and St. Paul (all at 1.2). Among the bottom six,
four are in sanctuary regions.
The variation here is enormous, with the San Antonio Office having
seventy-four times the detention rate of the San Francisco Field Office for
individuals classified as "no threat." Even comparing El Paso to other field
offices responsible for border areas, El Paso stands out, with more than
double the detention rates of San Antonio and Phoenix for noncitizens with
no criminal history. Comparing the detention rate of San Francisco to a
nonborder field Office, New Orleans, there is still a huge difference, with
the New Orleans Field Office having sixty-six times the detention rate of the
San Francisco Field Office for noncitizens without any convictions. There
is also substantial variation among field offices in sanctuary regions, as
exemplified by Seattle having ten times the detention rate of San Francisco.
Turning to the percentage of a field office's detained population that was
classified as "no threat," there was a wide range from 27% to 79.4%, with
an average of 51%. The eight field offices with the highest percentages of
detainees who had no convictions were: San Diego (79.4%), San Antonio
(78.4%), New Orleans (72.6%), Phoenix (72.3%), Denver (60.7%),
Houston (60.5%), El Paso (59.7%), and Los Angeles (54.4%). Four of these
eight are in antisanctuary regions (San Antonio, New Orleans, Phoenix, and
Houston).
At the opposite end of the spectrum, with the lowest percentage of
detainees classified as "no threat," were San Francisco (27.3%), St. Paul
176.

See 8 C.F.R. §.1001.1(q).
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(29.5%), Salt Lake City (31.8%), New York City (34.4%), Chicago
(38.8%), Washington, D.C. (38.9%), Philadelphia (41.3%), and Baltimore
(41.5%). Three of these (San Francisco, New York City, and Baltimore) are
in sanctuary regions. The other field offices in sanctuary regions were closer
to the average: Newark (48.8%), Seattle (51.7%), Boston (54.1%), and Los
Angeles (54.4%).
These numbers show significant variations even among field offices
located in sanctuary regions with respect to the percentage of detainees
classified as "no threat." The Los Angeles Field Office, for example,
oversees a detained population where over half the noncitizens are classified
as "no threat," while only about a quarter of the detainees overseen by the
San Francisco Field Office are in the "no threat" category.
3. Detainees Classified as Highest Threat
The number of detained noncitizens classified as the highest threat level
per 1000 unauthorized individuals ranged from 0.3 in San Francisco to 4.4
in Buffalo, with a mean of 1.0. The field offices in the top third were Buffalo
(4.7), Detroit (2.6), Philadelphia (1.8), New Orleans (1.6), St. Paul (1.3),
San Diego (1.1), Denver (1.0), and Washington, D.C. (1.0). None of the
field offices in sanctuary regions were in the top third. At the same time,
New Orleans was the only field office in the top third that is in an
antisanctuary region.
The field offices in the bottom third, with the lowest detention rate for
noncitizens in the highest threat category were: San Francisco (0.3), New
York City (0.3), Los Angeles (0.4), Baltimore (0.4), Dallas (0.5), Chicago
(0.5), Salt Lake City (0.5), and San Antonio (.5). The bottom four are all in
sanctuary regions, but Dallas and San Antonio are in antisanctuary regions.
With respect to the percentage of detainees within a field office's
jurisdiction who are categorized as the highest threat level, the average was
22.9%, with a range of 2.9% to 54.3%. The field offices with highest
percentages of detainees in this category were: Detroit (54.3%), San

Francisco (49.7%), Buffalo (32.2%), Philadelphia (31.5%), St. Paul
(30.9%), Baltimore (29.1%), Salt Lake City (27.2%), and Boston (26.5%).
Three of these (San Francisco, Baltimore, and Boston) are in sanctuary
regions. Notably absent from this list are any field offices in antisanctuary
regions, so antisanctuary regions did not detain high percentages of "threat
level 1" individuals.
In fact, several field offices in antisanctuary regions were among the
field offices with the lowest percentages of detained individuals classified
as "threat level 1." The bottom third included: San Antonio (2.9%), El Paso
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(4.1%), Phoenix (5.7%), New Orleans (8.6%), San Diego (11.1%), Houston
(12.1%), Denver (15.5%), and Atlanta (17.8%). Five of these eight are in
antisanctuary regions (San Antonio, Phoenix, New Orleans, Houston, and
Atlanta), and none are in sanctuary regions.
4. Alternatives to Detention
While there are many alternatives to detention, including release on bond
or under an order of supervision, this section refers to ICE's official ATD
program, which is limited to three forms of electronic monitoring.177 The
most invasive is GPS monitoring, which requires the noncitizen to wear an
ankle bracelet. 17 8 Less physically invasive versions involve telephonic
check-ins with voice recognition software and checking in with ICE through
a phone App called SmartLINK.'7 9
There are substantial variations in the use of ATDs by field offices, just
as there are huge disparities in detention rates. A 2014 GAO report found
differences in how ICE guidance on ATDs was implemented by field offices
and specifically noted that ICE "has not monitored the extent to which ERO
field offices have consistently implemented the guidance" on ATDs.1 80
According to the GAO, some field offices may limit their use of ATDs
because they lack the resources to respond to instances of noncompliance.' 81
177. See generally Fatma E. Marouf, Alternatives to Immigration Detention, 38 CARDOZO L.
REV. 2141 (2017); Mary Holper, Immigration E-Carceration: A Faustian Bargain (Bos. Coll. L. Sch.

Legal
Stud.,
Research
Paper
No.
539,
2020),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=3689912 [https://perma.cc/P7KD-Rv87].
178. Sarah Betencourt, 'Traumatizing and Abusive:' Immigrants Reveal Personal Toll of Ankle
Monitors, GUARDIAN (July 12, 2021), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2021/jul/12/immigrantsreport-physical-emotional-harms-electronic-ankle-monitors [https://perma.cc/BA6H-5A2B]. A report

by the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law Immigration Justice Clinic, Freedom for Immigrants, and
Immigrant Defense Project documents the mental and physical toll of GPS monitors based on survey
responses from 150 immigrants across the country and aggregate data of over 950 cases from three major
legal service providers. See TOSCA GIUSTINI ET AL., IMMIGRATION CYBER PRISONS: ENDING THE USE
OF
ELECTRONIC
ANKLE
SHACKLES
(2021),

https://larc.cardozo.yu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1 002&context=faculty-online-pubs
[https://perma.cc/RG2Z-GSRY]; see also ALY PANJWANI, ICE DIGITAL PRISONS: THE EXPANSION OF
MASS
SURVEILLANCE
AS
ICE'S
ALTERNATIVE
TO
https://www.flipsnack.com/JustFutures/ice-digital-prisons-lu8w3fndlj.html

DETENTION
(2021),
[https://perma.cc/Q2F5-

W6WF].
179. AUDREY SINGER, CONG. RSCH.
8
(ATD)
PROGRAMS
DETENTION

SERV., R45804, IMMIGRATION: ALTERNATIVES TO
(2019),

https://sgp.fas.org/crs/homesec/R45804.pdf

[https://perma.cc/LC3C-SMM7]. For a general discussion of many forms of electronic surveillance, see
JAMES KILGORE, UNDERSTANDING E-CARCERATION: ELECTRONIC MONITORING, THE SURVEILLANCE
STATE, AND THE FUTURE OF MASS INCARCERATION (2022).
180. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-15-36, ALTERNATIVES TO DETENTION:
IMPROVED DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSES NEEDED TO BETTER ASSESS PROGRAM EFFECTIVENESS

13 (2014), https://www.gao.gov/assets/670/666911.pdf [https://perma.cc/SC59-HLMH].
181. Id. at 29.
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In FY 2019, there were a total of 83,186 noncitizens enrolled in ATDs.
Looking at the number of people enrolled in ATDs for every 1000
unauthorized individuals in a field office's jurisdiction, the average ATD
enrollment rate across field offices was 8.8, with a range from 2.0 for the
Seattle Field Office to 26.2 for the El Paso Field Offices. The field offices
ranking in the top third, with the highest ATD rates, were El Paso (26.2),
New Orleans (22.0), Miami (18.0), Washington, D.C. (16.7), Boston (12.1),
and Baltimore (11.8). The field offices in the bottom third, with the lowest
ATD rates were Seattle (2.0), Salt Lake City (2.6), San Francisco (3.4),

Buffalo (3.6), Los Angeles (3.7), Chicago (3.7), Newark (3.8), and Buffalo
(3.9).
Some field offices relied more on ATDs than detention. Looking at the
ratio of the number of noncitizens in ATDs compared to the detained
population, Baltimore had over eight times as many people in ATDs as
detained, followed by San Francisco, with six times as many people in
ATDs as detained. Miami, New York City, and Washington, D.C. had four
to five times as many people in ATDs as detained. Field offices with fewer
people in ATDs than detention included Buffalo (ratio of 0.3, meaning
Buffalo had an ATD rate that was less than one-third of its detained rate),
San Antonio (ratio of 0.4), Phoenix (ratio of 0.5), Seattle (ratio 0.5), and
Denver (ratio of 0.8).
The average ATD enrollment rate among field offices in antisanctuary
regions was 82% higher than in sanctuary regions, but the overall detention
rate was four times higher.
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Table 5: Detention and ATD Rates for Field Offices in Sanctuary and Antisanctuary
Regions in FY 2019. (Rates Represent the Number of People Detained or Enrolled in ATDs
for Every 1000 Unauthorized Individuals in a Field Office's Geographic Area of
Responsibility).
Field Office

Overall
Detention Rate

Detention Rate:
No Threat

Detention Rate:
Highest Threat

ATD
Enrollment
Rate

Baltimore
Boston
Los Angeles

1.4
2.3
1.5

0.6
1.2
0.8

0.4
0.6
0.4

11.8
12.1
3.7

New York City 1.3

0.4

0.3

5.7

Newark

2.5

1.2

0.6

3.8

San Francisco

0.6

0.2

0.3

3.4

Seattle

3.8

2

0.9

2

Sanctuary

1.9

0.9

0.5

6

4.2
2.4
5.9
3.3
18.2
14.8
18.9

2.2

0.7

1.2
3.6
1.6
13.2
10.7
14.8

0.4
0.7

0.5

9.5
4.5
8.2
18
22
6.7
7.3

9.7

6.8

0.8

10.9

Average

Atlanta
Dallas
Houston
Miami
New Orleans
Phoenix
San Antonio
Andsanctuary
Average

0.8
1.6

0.8

D. Summary of Results
The New Orleans Field Office, which oversees five southern states,
stands out as having one of the most aggressive approaches to enforcement.
Its numbers are often comparable to San Antonio, although the New Orleans
field office does not oversee a U.S.-Mexico border region. Whether
compared to the New York City Field Office, which is in a sanctuary region,
or to the Miami Field Office, which is in another antisanctuary region, New
Orleans is far more aggressive. For example, the New Orleans Field Office
had over four times the detainer request rate of New York City and double
the detainer request rate of Miami; its overall arrest rate was ten times that
of the New York City more than twice that of Miami; its removal rate was
almost twelve times higher than New York City and three times higher than
Miami; its overall detention rate was fourteen times higher than New York
City's and over five times higher than Miami's. The large number of
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detention beds and "guaranteed minimums" in the jurisdiction of the New
Orleans Field Office is likely an important factor that influences the use of
discretion and drives arrests, detention, and removal.
While some degree of variation in federal immigration enforcement is
expected and may even be desirable to allow for experimentation by
18 2
frontline officers, as Professor Landau contends, the dramatic differences
discussed above signal a deeply flawed and unfair system. The magnitude
of the variations discussed above are simply incompatible with a goal of
equitable enforcement. These differences cannot be chalked up to implicit
bias, because, as Professor Michael Siegel has noted, "implicit racial bias
183
It is therefore
simply does not vary that much across geographic areas."
important to consider other explanations, such as the convergence of various
state, local, and federal pressures on field offices, which can incorporate
elements of structural racism. 8 4 Geography and allocation of resources
clearly play an important role too.
Beyond the sheer scale of the disparities, several other valuable lessons
can be derived from the data discussed above. First, field offices in
sanctuary regions had the lowest rates of detainer requests, the lowest
overall arrest rates, the lowest arrest rates of noncitizens with no criminal
history, the lowest arrest rates of noncitizens with convictions, the lowest
overall removal rates, and the lowest removal rates of convicted noncitizens.
The fact that sanctuary jurisdictions have the lowest arrest rates for
noncitizens with no criminal history is especially important because it
undercuts the notion that failure of state and local law enforcement to
cooperate with ICE will lead to more noncriminal arrests.
However, it is also important to recognize the disparities that exist
among field offices in sanctuary regions. For example, the San Francisco
and Los Angeles field offices had approximately double the detainer request
rates of the New York City, Boston, Baltimore, and Newark field offices.
The Newark Field Office had double the arrest rate of the New York City
Field Office. The Baltimore and Seattle field offices had arrest rates of
noncitizens with no criminal history that were three to five times higher than
the Los Angeles, San Francisco, and New York City field offices. And
Seattle had an overall removal rate that was more than three times that of
182.

See Landau, supra note 19, at 1235 (pointing out that variation allows for "creative exercises

of discretion").
183. Michael Siegel, Racial Disparities in Fatal Police Shootings: An Empirical Analysis
Informed by Critical Race Theory, 100 B.U. L. REV. 1069, 1081 (2020) (observing that "the average
level of implicit racial bias of people living in the state with the highest average level (measured by
scores on the racial Implicit Attitudes Test) differs from that in the state with the lowest average level

by only 34%").
184.

Id. (discussing structural racism as an alternative explanation).
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New York City, a removal rate of noncitizens with no criminal history that
was nearly eight times that of San Francisco, and a removal rate for
convicted noncitizens that was four times that of New York City.
Additionally, despite having low detention rates, certain field offices in
sanctuary cities do not appear to be focusing their resources on mandatory
detainees. It is particularly striking that half of the detained population in
the jurisdiction of the New York City Field Office, and over 40% of the
detained population in the jurisdiction of the Newark Field Office, are
detained as a matter of discretion, not because the statute requires it.
Compared to field offices in sanctuary locations, field offices in
antisanctuary regions had, on average, a detainer request rate that was twice
as high (9.6 vs. 20), an overall arrest rate that was over three times as high
(5.6 vs. 21.8), an arrest rate for noncitizens with no criminal history that was
over three times as high (0.8 vs. 2.9), an arrest rate for convicted noncitizens
that was over three times as high (3.7 vs. 13.4), and an arrest rate for
noncitizens with a pending criminal charge that was five times as high (1.1
vs. 5.5). With respect to removals, field offices in antisanctuary regions had,
on average, an overall removal rate that was nine times higher than the
average for field offices in sanctuary regions (6.1 vs. 57.0), a removal rate
for noncitizens with no criminal history that was over twelve times higher
(1.8 vs. 22.2), a removal rate for convicted noncitizens that was more than
eight times higher (3.5 vs. 29.8), and a removal rate for noncitizens with a
pending criminal charge that was over six times higher (0.7 vs. 4.6).
Although field offices in antisanctuary regions have an ATD enrollment that
was twice as high as field offices in sanctuary regions, their detention rate
was five times higher (1.9 vs. 9.7). Further, the average detention rate for
noncitizens deemed "no threat" (i.e., noncitizens with no convictions) was
over seven times higher among field offices in antisanctuary regions (0.9 vs.
6.8), while the detention rate for noncitizens classified as "threat level 1"
(the highest threat level) was only 60% higher (0.5 vs. 0.8).
Nevertheless, field offices in antisanctuary regions tended to be less
clustered at one end of the spectrum. The eight field offices with the highest
detainer request rates (i.e., the top third) included only four of the seven
field offices in antisanctuary regions. Similarly, only four out of the eight
field offices with the highest overall arrest rates were in antisanctuary
regions; only three out of the eight field offices with the highest arrest rates
of noncitizens with no criminal history were in antisanctuary regions; and
only four out of the top eight field offices with the highest arrest rates of
convicted noncitizens were in antisanctuary regions. These figures suggest
that while being in an antisanctuary region plays a role in detainer requests
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and arrests, other important factors also influence the decisions made by

field offices.
As with field offices in sanctuary regions, substantial variations exist
among field offices in antisanctuary regions. For example, the San Antonio
Field Office's overall arrest rate was over twice as high as Miami's, its arrest
rate for noncitizens with no criminal history was seven times higher than
Houston's and six times higher than Dallas's. San Antonio, New Orleans,
and Phoenix had higher rates in almost every category than Atlanta, Dallas,
Houston, and Miami. Two notable exceptions are the high rate of detainer
requests by the Atlanta Field Office, which was the same as Phoenix's, and
the Dallas Field Office's arrest rate for convicted noncitizens, which was
the highest in the country.
Arrests of noncitizens with no criminal history are least likely to be
affected by location in a sanctuary or antisanctuary region, since those
classifications primarily affect noncitizens who have entered the criminal
justice system. Disparities in arrests of noncitizens with no criminal history
can therefore highlight differences in how field offices exercise their
discretion about whom to arrest, although field offices in border areas are
faced with the largest numbers of recent migrants with no criminal history.
The data show that Dallas and Houston rank in the bottom third of field
offices in arrests rates of noncitizens with no criminal history, despite
having overall arrest rates in the top third. In fact, Dallas and Houston had
lower arrest rates for noncitizens with no criminal history than two field
offices in sanctuary regions, Baltimore and Seattle. This suggests that Dallas
and Houston may be exercising their discretion more favorably for
noncitizens with no criminal history than other field offices in antisanctuary
regions. Local politics in these "blue" cities could also be influencing
decisions about arrests by these two field offices.
In theory, noncriminal arrest rates should be shaped primarily by national
enforcement priorities. While there was less variation in this category than
some of the others, with about half the field offices having noncriminal
arrest rates between 1 and 2, the range was still wide, from 0.3 in San
Francisco to 7.2 in San Antonio, which is twenty-four times higher. Even
comparing San Francisco with Detroit, which is not in an antisanctuary
region or responsible for a U.S.-Mexico border region, Detroit had a
noncriminal arrest rate that was fourteen times higher. These disparities
suggest that field offices may be applying their own priorities or
discretionary standards, and that there is great variation among them. As
noted above, the Trump Administration never set clear priorities, so it would
not be surprising if field offices made different choices about arrests of
noncitizens with no criminal history.

2022]

REGIONAL IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT

1647

Similarly, when it comes to the detention and removal of noncitizens
with no criminal history, there is substantial variation among field offices
in the absence of central policies. Detention rates of individuals without
convictions ranged from 0.2 in San Francisco to 14.8 in San Antonio, which
is seventy-four times higher. Notably, the Dallas and Miami field offices
had detention rates for noncitizens with no criminal history comparable to
those of Newark and Seattle, suggesting that decisions involving the
exercise of discretion in this category were not dictated by
sanctuary/antisanctuary classifications.
With respect to removal rates of noncitizens with no criminal history,
there is also a wide range, suggesting that field offices are exercising
discretion in different ways. As previously noted, these rates ranged from
0.6 for the San Francisco Field Office to 79.0 for San Antonio, which is 132
times higher. Even if we exclude the four field offices that oversee U.S.Mexico border regions and have particularly high removal rates, there is a
wide range among the remaining field offices. The New Orleans Field
Office, for example, has over twenty times the removal rate of San Francisco
for noncitizens with no criminal history.
Finally, insofar as ICE's goal is to detain and remove noncitizens that
pose a threat, it is important to note that there was less variation among field
offices in detention rates for noncitizens in the highest threat category than
in other categories. The average among field offices in sanctuary regions
was 0.5 compared to 0.8 in antisanctuary regions.
IV. IMPLICATIONS

A. Implicationsfor Immigration Policymaking
Administrative law generally assumes that federal agencies implement
laws and policies consistently across the nation. 18 5 The data discussed
above, however, show enormous disparities in how ICE field offices
approach immigration enforcement around the country. Regional variations
in the implementation of federal laws and policies are not necessarily
negative. For example, Professors Yishai Blank and Issi Rosen-Zvi have
persuasively argued that federal regional offices can be meaningful
policymakers in certain contexts.' 86 They point out that variation at the
federal level can promote federalist values of experimentation and

185.
186.

Owen, supra note 7, at 116; Blank & Rosen-Zvi, supra note 7, at 1992.
Blank & Rosen-Zvi, supra note 7, at 1903.
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innovation, just like variation at the state level.' 87 In areas such as
environmental regulation, emergency management, and housing and urban
development, federal regional variation may indeed be desirable.
In the immigration context, however, even Professors Blank and RosenZvi recognize that regional variations would be problematic. They
acknowledge that "when core liberty interests are at stake and when
vulnerable regional minorities are endangered, consistent application with
very little regional variation should be the rule."18 8 Among immigration
scholars, Michael Wishnie has famously warned against creating
"laboratories of bigotry." 89 Similarly, Professor Aziz Huq has observed that
"[o]smotic absorption of prevailing racial norms is . . . a function of
decentralization and the diffusion of discretion." 190
When considering the high arrest, detention, and removal rates by field
offices that oversee regions in the South, such as New Orleans, it is also
important to keep in mind the history of racism in regional variations in the
implementation of federal laws and policies. As Professor Bulman-Pozen
has explained, federal programs established by New Deal legislation were
intentionally designed to have regional variations in order to
"accommodate[] Jim Crow" and "leave untouched the South's racial
order." 191 These federal programs "both subsidized a brutal caste system
[based on a supply of black labor] and normalized a regional approach to
federal law." 192 Federal statutes "shifted decisionmaking authority to federal
193
To
executive officials, who in turn provided for regional adjustments."
the extent that ICE field offices overseeing regions in the South have
disproportionately high rates of arrest, detention, and removal, they are
exacerbating racial injustices that have long plagued the region, especially
given the large number of black migrants from African countries detained
1 94
in those jurisdictions and their allegations of physical abuse and coercion.
187. Similarly, David Owen asks, "What would administrative law look like if we sometimes
accorded regional variation within federal administrative agencies some of the same value that we
attribute to variation outside those agencies?" Owen, supranote 7, at 117.

188.

Bank & Rosen-Zvi, supra note 7, at 1959.

189.

Michael J. Wishnie, Laboratoriesof Bigotry? Devolution of the Immigration Power, Equal

Protection, and Federalism,76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 493, 515-18 (2001).
190. Huq, supra note 37, at 107-08.
191.

Bulman-Pozen, supra note 7, at 402.

192.
193.

Id.
Id. at 403.

194.

See, e.g., Joe Penney, The Hunger Strikes of PinePrairie:ProtestingIndefinite Detention by

ICE,

N.Y. REV. BooKs (Sept. 8, 2020), https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2020/09/08/the-hungerstrikers-of-pine-prairie-protesting-indefinite-detention-by-ice/ [https://perma.cc/8JZ6-F7A9]; ICE Is

Using Torture Against CameroonianImmigrants to Coerce Deportation, According to New Complaint

Filed

by

Immigrant

Rights

Group,

S.

POVERTY

L.

CTR.

(Oct.

8,

2020),
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Overall, the variations among field offices discussed above highlight a
need to increase fairness, predictability, and transparency in immigration
enforcement. This can be done while still preserving flexibility and some
opportunity for experimentation by field offices.' 95 Strong central controls
do not necessarily eliminate the potential for bottom-up solutions from
within DHS/ICE. As Joseph Landau has described, frontline officers have
proposed innovative immigration policies in the past that were adopted by
higher-ups. 96 Keeping channels of communication open among frontline
officers, field office directors, and headquarters is essential to promoting
consistency and problem solving when obstacles to consistent
implementation arise.
From ICE's perspective, consistency should also be valued because
inequitable enforcement decreases the agency's legitimacy in the public's
view. In the policing context, studies have found that public perceptions of
fairness and legitimacy are associated with cooperation and compliance. 97
Three ways for the President (or DHS/ICE, under the President's direction)
to try to promote more consistent enforcement practices are issuing
guidelines, promulgating regulations, and expanding performance metrics
to reflect multiple goals.
1. Enforcement Guidelines
Agency guidelines on how to exercise discretion are one way to try to
achieve greater consistency in enforcement decisions nationwide. President
Obama adopted such guidelines, and President Biden has done the same.' 98
https://www.splcenter.org/presscenter/ice-using-torture-against-cameroonian-immigrants-coercedeportation-according-new [https://perma.cc/D6J3-3KFv]; "After About 5 Minutes of Struggle, They
Forced My Index Finger on the Paper": ICE Forcing More Asylum Seekers to Sign Deportation
Paperwork as Another Deportation Flight to Cameroon Looms, S. POVERTY L. CTR. (Nov. 9, 2020),
https://www.splcenter.org/presscenter/after-about-5-minutes-struggle-they-forced-my-index-finger-

paper-ice-forcing-more-asylum [https://perma.cc/UXQ4-2EDS].
195. Cf Medha D. Makhlouf, Laboratories of Exclusion: Medicaid, Federalism & Immigrants,
95 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1680, 1775 (2020) (arguing, in the context of noncitizens' access to health care, that

"Congress might consider giving states some flexibility-'microspheres of autonomy'-to make policy
choices that best serve their populations within a federal scheme that promotes national goals").

196.

Landau, supra note 19, at 1176-77.

See Hadar Aviram & Daniel L. Portman, Inequitable Enforcement: Introducing the Concept
ofLaw Enforcement, 61 HASTiNGS L.J. 413,453 (2009) (explaining
that an "insistence on police adherence to a sense of proportion" will have a "long-term benefit for police
activities" by "generating a public sentiment that police enforcement is fair" and citing empirical
197.

ofEquity into Constitutional Review
studies).
198.

See Memorandum from David Pekoske, Acting Sec'y, Dept. of Homeland Sec. to Troy

Miller et al., Senior Off. Performing the Duties of the Comm'r, U.S. Customs and Border Prot. (Jan. 20,

2021)

[hereinafter

Memorandum

from

David

Pekoske],
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However, as discussed above, not all field offices and ICE agents complied
with the memos on enforcement priorities and prosecutorial discretion to
the same extent, with some actively opposing them. Similarly, in the context
certain U.S. attorney's offices resisted
of prosecutor's offices,
implementing memos from the Attorney General on prosecutorial discretion
because they perceived the memos as undermining their law enforcement
duties. 199 As Professor Rachel Barkow has observed, "while presidential
directives can bring about policy changes, the hardest change to effectuate
2 00
is in the minds of the frontline law enforcement officials at agencies."
In both the immigration and criminal contexts, guidelines on
enforcement are challenging because they trigger concerns within the
agency about compromising deterrence. 201 Additionally, it is difficult to
determine the right amount of detail for such guidelines. If they are too
vague, they fail to curb discretion; if they are too detailed, they risk omitting
certain situations where prosecutorial discretion may be warranted.
The potential for litigation over prosecutorial discretion guidelines also
remains. In the immigration context, internal guidelines regarding
enforcement discretion have repeatedly been challenged through lawsuits
arguing that they actually constitute rules that should have gone through the
notice and comment rulemaking process, as exemplified by the DACA case
that was ultimately decided by the Supreme Court. 202 While internal
guidelines and policy documents are exempted from notice and comment,
legislative rules are not. Yet the line between these categories is far from
clear.2 0 3
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/21 _0120_enforccmentmemo_signed.pdf?fbclid=lwAR1_30JIuWvOGzmC2sgRNqjserFRMn65skMoIOl88xgTzlxalGXqP6
Gus [https://perma.cc/V58U-9KYR]. This memo identifics three priority categories: (1) noncitizens
involved in terrorism, spying, or other threats to national security; (2) noncitizens who entered the United
States without inspection on or after November 1, 2020; and (3) noncitizens imprisoned in local, state,
or federal jails or prisons who have an "aggravated felony" conviction, which is a term of art under the

INA,

and who are deemed a threat to public safety. Id. at 2.
199. Rachel E. Barkow, Overseeing Agency Enforcement, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1129, 1136
(2016).
200. Id. at 1135.
201. Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from
Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 912 (2009); see also Ronald F. Wright, Sentencing
Commissions as Provocateurs of Prosecutorial Self-Regulation, 105 COLUM. L. REv. 1010, 1019-22
(2005) (discussing why prosecutorial guidelines have not been adopted).
202. See Dep't of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891 (2020) (holding
that DHS's rescission of DACA violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) because the agency
did not provide a reasoned explanation for its action).

203. See, e.g., David L. Franklin, Legislative Rules, Nonlegislative Rules, and the Perils of the
Short Cut, 120 YALE L.J. 276, 278 (2010) ("There is perhaps no more vexing conundrum in the field of
administrative law than the problem of defining a workable distinction between legislative and
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Nevertheless, imperfect as they are, guidelines that clearly identify
priority categories and encourage the use of discretion at all stages of
immigration enforcement are helpful to have as one strategy to promote
greater consistency across field offices. Along these lines, the memo issued
by the Biden Administration on the first day in office stresses that the
prosecutorial discretion priorities shall "apply not only to the decision to
issue, serve, file or cancel a Notice to Appear," which is the charging
document in immigration court, "but also to a broad range of other
discretionary enforcement decisions, including decision: whom to stop,
question, arrest; whom to detain or release whether to settle, dismiss, appeal,
or join in a motion on a case; and whether to grant deferred action or
parole." 2 4
Besides addressing enforcement priorities and prosecutorial discretion,
guidelines or other internal rules of agency procedure could impose
requirements that must be satisfied before an officer takes certain
enforcement actions. 205 For example, if the agency establishes a
presumption that asylum seekers should be released on parole, then the
agency could mandate a higher level of approval (e.g., by Field Office
Directors or Assistant Field Office Directors) for decisions denying parole
to asylum seekers. 206 Similarly, higher-level review could be required for
all decisions to detain or pursue removal proceedings against someone who
does not fall within a priority category. Mandating higher-level approval
would improve transparency within a field office and provide a way to
check for consistency with central policies.
For this type of higher-level review to be effective, however, exceptions
must be constrained. The issue of transfers between detention facilities
during the COVID-19 pandemic provides a cautionary tale. ICE's COVID19 Pandemic Response Requirements tried to reduce the number of
unnecessary transfers, which risked spreading the virus, by generally
prohibiting transfers unless the transfer was for purposes of "medical
evaluation, medical isolation/quarantine, clinical care, extenuating security

nonlegislative rules."); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., DistinguishingLegislative Rulesfrom InterpretativeRules,
52 ADMIN. L. REv. 547, 547 (2000) ("For over fifty years, courts and commentators have struggled to

identify, and to apply, criteria that are appropriate to distinguish between legislative rules and
interpretative rules.").
204. See Memorandum from David Pekoske, supra note 198, at 2.

205.

Barkow, supra note 199, at 1148.

206.

The court's injunction in Fraihat,for example, requires a written decision with justification.

Fraihat v. ICE, 445 F. Supp. 3d 709 (C.D. Cal. 2020), order clarified, No. EDCVI91546, 2020 WL
6541994 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2020), rev'd, 16 F.4th 613 (9th Cir. 2021).
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2 07
Any other
concerns, release or removal, or to prevent overcrowding."
type of transfer required the "justification and pre-approval" of the Field
Office Director. 208 One of the reasons this directive did not prove effective
is because the enumerated exceptions allowing transfers swallowed the

rule.209

In short, while guideline and internal agency procedures can be very
helpful in curbing discretion, they are unlikely to resolve the issue of
disparities on their own. Therefore, it is also important to consider other
reforms that may change the behavior of immigration officers, such as
binding rules and performance metrics.
2. Notice and Comment Rulemaking
If ICE articulated enforcement policies through written rules, with
opportunity for public input through notice and comment, field office
directors and rank-and-file officers may perceive them as more legitimate
than priorities or prosecutorial discretion policies announced in guidelines
and may therefore feel more bound to follow them. 210 In the policing
context, prominent scholars have supported this approach, arguing that the
21 1
but also
public rulemaking process not only constrains discretion,

207. ICE ERO,
COVID-19
PANDEMIC
RESPONSE
REQUIREMENTS
37-38
https://www.ice.gov/doclib/coronavirus/eroCOVlD 9responseReqsCleanFacilities.pdf
[https://perma.cc/U2UP-K3MS].
208. Id.

(2021),

209. For examples of transfers resulting in outbreaks around the country, see Lisa Riordan Seville
& Hannah Rappleye, ICE Keeps TransferringDetainees Around the Country, Leading to COVID-19

Outbreaks, NBC NEWS (May 31, 2020, 5:08 AM), https://www.nbenews.com/politics/immigration/icekeeps-transferring-detainees-around-country-leading-covid-19-outbreaks-n1212856
[https://perma.cc/2WGS-KKKF]; Dianne Solis, Virus Began Spreading in Texas Detention Center as
Positive Immigrants Were Quickly Transferred in from Northeast, DALL. MORNING NEWS (Apr. 27,
2020, 10:38 PM), https://www.dallasnews.com/news/public-health/2020/04/27/virus-began-spreadingin-texas-detention-center-as-positive-immigrants-were-quickly-transferred-in-from-northeast/

[https://perma.cc/DDX3-MHB7].
210.

See Ming H. Chen, Trust in Immigration Enforcement: State Noncooperation and Sanctuary

Cities After Secure Communities, 91 CHi-KENT L. REV. 13 (2015) (developing an account of
noncooperation based on perceptions of federal action's legitimacy).
211. See, e.g., Erik Luna, PrincipledEnforcement of Penal Codes, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 515,

&

594-608 (2000) (arguing in favor of rulemaking to cabin enforcement discretion); Barry Friedman
Maria Ponomarenko, Democratic Policing, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1827, 1843-48 (2015) (discussing
notice-and-comment rulemaking as one model for how the public could have an opportunity to weigh

in on police policies that affect them); Eric J. Miller, Challenging Police Discretion,58 HOW. L.J. 521,
525 (2015).
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promotes professionalism within police agencies,212 improves the overall
functioning of the criminal justice system, 213 and bolsters democracy. 214
In a recent article, Professors Christopher J. Walker and Shoba
Sivaprasad Wadhia highlight the value of the deliberative process that is
part of rulemaking, explaining that "[t]he proposed rule has to reflect
considered judgment through weighing regulatory alternatives, assessing
the intended and unintended consequences, and making the data supporting
the proposed rule publicly available." 215 They further argue that rulemaking
promotes "deliberative accountability," because the agency must explain its
actions in light of public input. 216
On the other hand, as Professor Maria Ponomarenko points out, agency
rulemaking is usually aimed at regulating the public, whereas scholars who
support rulemaking in the policing context are really interested in rules the
police would use to regulate themselves.21 The same concern applies in the
context of immigration enforcement, where the types of rules critics of the
current system would like to see generally pertain to regulating ICE officers,
not the public. 218
Rulemaking is particularly difficult when the desired rules pertain to the
use of discretion because agencies generally have no incentive to issue such
rules. 2 19 Like guidelines, rules addressing prosecutorial discretion can
212. Herman Goldstein, Police Policy Formulation: A Proposal for Improving Police
Performance, 65 MICH. L. REV. 1123, 1130 (1967).
213. Id.
214.

Richard A. Bierschbach, Fragmentation and Democracy in the Constitutional Law of

Punishment, 111 Nw. U. L. REV. 1437, 1453 (2017) (arguing in favor of "[s]ubjecting wholesale police,
prosecutorial, and sentencing policies to some variant of a notice-and-comment process"); Jonathan M.
Smith, Closing the Gap Between What Is Lawful and What Is Right in Police Use of ForceJurisprudence
by Making Police Departments More DemocraticInstitutions, 21 MICH. J. RACE & L. 315, 336 (2016)
(calling for democratization of policing, including the policy formulation process).

215. Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia & Christopher J. Walker, The Case Against Chevron Deference
in ImmigrationAdjudication, 70 DUKE L.J. 1197, 1225 (2021).
216.

Id. at 1232 (citing Kristin E. Hickman & Aaron L. Nielson, Narrowing Chevron'sDomain,

70 DUKE L.J. 931, 967 (2021)).
217. Maria Ponomarenko, Rethinking Police Rulemaking, 114 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 7 (2019)
(arguing that rulemaking is not an effective way to govern the police and proposing "regulatory
intermediaries" as an alternative).

218.
2, 2018),

See, e.g., Brian Tashman, Congress Needs to HoldICE Accountable forAbuses, ACLU (Feb.
https://www.aclu.org/blog/immigrants-rights/ice-and-border-patrol-abuses/congress-needs-

hold-ice-accountable-abuses [https://perma.cc/NZ8Y-MYZE] (arguing that "ICE needs to be held to
account for its abuses and lawlessness" and criticizing ICE officers for actions such as "[going] after
parents dropping off their children at school; primary caregivers to family members with disabilities;
domestic abuse survivors seeking legal protections; religious minorities who fear persecution; political
activists; community leaders; and people who work everywhere from convenience stores to dairy
farms").
219. Ponomarenko, supra note 217, at 44 (arguing that "[fjor enforcement discretion, the primary
obstacle is that policing agencies have few incentives to adopt guidelines and rules, and it may not be
possible to adopt a workable standard that requires them to do so").
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undermine the goal of deterrence. 22 0 This concern is even greater in the
rulemaking context because the notice and comment process draws public
attention to the proposed rules. 22 1 ICE may also be concerned that such rules
would send a message to Congress that the agency is not enforcing the
statute as intended, which could affect appropriations. In addition, ICE may
be motivated to avoid litigation challenging the rules. Given that the ICE
employees' union has sued multiple times in the past to challenge
prosecutorial discretion policies under President Obama,22 2 it is not
unreasonable to anticipate lawsuits challenging rules that establish similar
policies.
Rulemaking could also backfire. If the political environment requires
being "tough on crime" and "enforcing our borders," rulemaking may
actually result in harsher policies than the agency would adopt informally
without such a public procedure. 22 3 And even if the agency did decide to
issue rules about the use of discretion, they would be as challenging to draft
as guidelines, and compliance could still be a problem, especially if
supervisors tolerate or encourage noncompliance.22 a
Further, as Professor Ponomarenko explains, "One significant limitation
of rulemaking procedures is that they are designed primarily to regulate
discrete changes to the status quo. . . . Traditional rulemaking is not an
invitation to rethink an entire regulatory scheme from top to bottom." 22 To
the extent substantial reforms are envisioned, rather than discrete changes
to enforcement practices, rulemaking may not be the best approach.
Scholars have already recognized these limitations of rulemaking in the
context of other agencies, such as intelligence agencies, 22 6 local law
enforcement agencies, 227 and prosecutors' offices. 228 Consequently, while
220.
221.
222.

Id. at 16.
Id. at 16 (citing Barkow, supra note 199).
Complaint, Crane v. Napolitano, No. 12-cv-03247, 2012 WL 3629252 (N.D. Tex. July 31,

2013); see also David A. Martin, A Defense of Immigration-Enforcement Discretion: The Legal and

Policy Flaws in Kris Kobach 's Latest Crusade, 122 YALE L.J.F. 167 (2012) (disputing the legal claims
made in the Crane litigation); Hiroshi Motomura, The President's Dilemma: Executive Authority,
Enforcement, and the Rule ofLaw in Immigration Law, 55 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 25 (2015) (discussing the
Crane litigation).
223. Ponomarenko, supra note 217, at 16 (making the same argument in the context of policing).

224.
225.
226.

Id. at 16-17.
Id. at 40-41.
See, e.g., Samuel J. Rascoff, DomesticatingIntelligence, 83 S. CAL. L. REv. 575 (2010).

227.
228.

See, e.g., Ponomarenko, supra note 217, at 7.
See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, ProsecutorialRegulation Versus Prosecutorial Accountability,

157 U. PA. L. REv. 959, 964 (2009) ("The moral of the story is that institutionalized regulations are
inherently blunt weapons, too crude and too sporadic to constrain prosecutors."); Barkow, supra note

201 (arguing that reforms to the institutional design of federal prosecutors' offices, such as separationof-functions requirements and greater supervision, would be a more effective and politically viable way

of curbing discretion than the leading alternative proposals).
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rulemaking can certainly play a role, it is useful to also look at other types
of oversight mechanisms and institutional designs that can improve
consistency and fairness in immigration enforcement.
3. Expanding PerformanceMetrics to Reflect Multiple Goals
Professor Barkow explains that "having an agency pay attention to
multiple values and goals . . . might help the agency to curb
overenforcement if consideration of those additional values emphasizes
factors that help to limit agency excess."22 9 The COVID-19 pandemic
highlighted how this can work in practice by forcing ICE to pay attention to
protecting public health as a value separate from enforcement. As a result
of a nationwide injunction issued in a case called Fraihatv. ICE (and a court
order enforcing that injunction), ICE had to release more people in high0
risk categories from detention and report those numbers to the court. 2 3
Performance metrics that can be quantified are one way to measure progress
towards an expanded range of values and goals.
ICE's self-described mission is to "protect[] the homeland through the
arrest and removal of noncitizens who undermine the safety of our
communities and the integrity of our immigration laws." 231 Accordingly,
ICE's performance metrics currently focus on the quantity of arrests and
removals, with particular attention to the number of people arrested and
removed with convictions or pending criminal charges. 2 32 ICE also
prominently features the number of detainers issued, emphasizing those
with serious crimes. 233 Additionally, ICE reports the number of people
enrolled in alternatives to detention, along with the "absconder rate." 234
One way to try to modify enforcement behavior is for ICE to adopt a
broader set of goals and priorities, with achievement measured by new
229. Barkow, supra note 199, at 1147 (emphasis added).
230. ICE's COVID-19 Pandemic Response Requirements, supra note 207, at 38, urged field
offices to reduce the detained population in all immigration facilities to 75% of capacity based on CDC's
recommendation. Additionally, under the injunction in Fraihat, ICE had to review its custody
determination for all detained individuals with a condition that placed them at risk of serious illness from
COVID-19, with a presumption favoring release for those not subject to mandatory detention. See

Fraihat v. ICE, 445 F. Supp. 3d 709 (C.D. Cal. 2020), order clarified, No. EDCV191546, 2020 WL
6541994 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2020), rev'd, 16 F.4th 613 (9th Cir. 2021).
231.

See Enforcement andRemoval Operations,ICE (Dec. 30, 2021) https://www.ice.gov/about-

ice/ero [https://perma.cc/KDX6-VYEP].
232.

See FY 2020: ICE Annual Report Highlights OperationalSuccesses in Year Shrouded by

COVID-19,
ICE
(Dec.
23,
2020)
[hereinafter
ICE
Annual
Report],
https://www.ice.gov/news/releases/fy-2020-ice-annual-report-highlights-operational-successes-yearshrouded-covid-19 [https://perma.ce/CGF2-F44G].
233. ERO FY 2020 Achievements, ICE (Oct. 29, 2021) [hereinafter ICE ERO FY 2020
Achievements], https://www.ice.gov/features/ERO-2020 [https://perma.cc/8H6P-FMM8].

234.

Id.
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metrics.23 5 Professor Barkow observes, "If you tell an agency official that
his or her budget or career advancement hinges on a particular outcome
6
measure, the official will have an incentive to focus on that measure."2 3
While determining the specific metrics that ICE should use is beyond the
scope of this Article, one illustrative example is for ICE to prioritize
reducing the detained population as a goal, not just during the pandemic,
but long term. 237 This idea is not unprecedented, as former Attorney General
Eric Holder embraced the idea of prioritizing the goal of reducing mass
incarceration for federal prosecutors. 238 During the pandemic, ICE has
already demonstrated that it is able to reduce the detained population when
it wants to, as detention numbers dropped to less than half the usual average
between March 2020 and September 2020.239
Another possible goal for ICE could be to uphold constitutional due
process rights, which could be measured in a variety of ways. In the policing
context, Professor Samuel Walker has argued that "the central problem of
governing the police is that we suffer not from a lack of democratic control,
but from a rather well functioning process of democratic governance in the
pursuit of the wrong values."24 0 The values he highlights as critical are
"commitment to constitutional policing ... and a commitment to the equal
protection of the law." 24 1
One way to apply the value of upholding constitutional rights in the
immigration context is to include a performance metric based on the number
of civil rights complaints submitted to the DHS Office of the Inspector
General (OIG) and the DHS Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties
(CRCL) regarding alleged violations for every field office (or detention
facilities within that field office's jurisdiction). Additionally, ICE could
examine the number of complaints of misconduct involving ICE officers by

235.
236.
237.

Barkow, supra note 199, at 1170-73.
Id. at 1170.
The Brennan Center suggested a similar priority of reducing mass incarceration for federal

prosecutors. LAUREN-BROOKE EISEN, NICOLE FORTIER & INIMAI CHETTIAR, BRENNAN CTR. FOR
JUST., FEDERAL PROSECUTION FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 33 (2014).
238. Eric Holder's Keynote Address: Shifting Law Enforcement Goals to Reduce Mass
Incarceration,BRENNAN
CTR.
FOR
JUST. (Sept.
23,
2014),
https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/keynote-address-shifting-law-enforcement-goals-to-reduce-

mass-incarceration [https://perma.cc/E9BQ-4KRH].
239. In FY 2020, ICE reported reaching a target of 70% of the population capacity for its
"dedicated facilities," meaning facilities that hold only immigration detainees, as opposed to local and
county jails that often hold immigration detainees and prisoners together. See ICE Annual Report, supra

note 232. Overall, ICE's detained population, which has usually averaged around 45,000, dropped to
20,000 by the end of FY 2020. See ICE ERO FY 2020 Achievements, supra note 233.
240. Samuel Walker, Governing the American Police: Wrestling with the Problems of
Democracy, 2016 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 615, 616 (2016).
241. Id.
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field office. DHS currently does not collect or monitor misconduct data
regarding its component agencies, including ICE. 2 4 2 Nor has DHS
"analyzed trends to determine whether misconduct issues are systematic." 243
However, according to a report submitted to Congress, the Joint Intake
Center for CBP and ICE received over "16,368 allegations of misconduct.
. . in fiscal year 2014 alone." 24 A survey of DHS employees conducted by
OIG found that nearly half(47%) of the ICE employees who responded "did
not agree that employees at all levels [of ICE] are held accountable for
conduct." 245 Creating metrics that capture misconduct and accountability
would prioritize the value of upholding constitutional rights.
Critically, in light of the regional disparities discussed above, reports on
all performance metrics should be broken down by field office and detention
facility to allow the agency, as well as the public, to analyze regional
differences. As Kate Andrias has persuasively argued, agencies' reports
should highlight regional disparities, not just provide the statistical
information needed to examine them. 24 6 Currently, ICE reports some
statistics by field office, but reports others only at the national level. Other
statistics are reported by detention facility. While ICE provides information
about the field office responsible for each detention facility, this requires an
extra level of calculation to analyze regional differences in detention,
masking those differences instead of highlighting them.
Of course, performance metrics also have potential drawbacks if not
designed well. There is a risk of developing metrics that are easy to track
rather than measurable goals to reach the outcomes that are truly desired. 24 7
One example of the perverse incentives that poorly designed performance
metrics can create is provided by Professors Brett McDonnell and Daniel
Schwarcz. They explained that in the 1990s, GAO's performance metrics
242. DHS OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., OIG-19-48, DHS NEEDS TO IMPROVE ITS OVERSIGHT OF
MISCONDUCT AND DISCIPLINE 6 (2019), https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2019-

06/OIG-19-48-Jun19.pdf [https://perma.cc/48BS-M52F].
243. Id. at 7.
244. Id. at 1 (citing U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., INVESTIGATION OF DHS EMPLOYEE
CORRUPTION
CASES
(2015),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Departmental%20Management%20and%200perat

ions%20%28DMO%29%20%201nvestigation%20of%20DHS%2OEmployee%20Corruption%20CasesO.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5H6Q-MDDP] (jointly issued by DHS OIG, ICE, and CBP)).
245. Id. at 10.
246. Kate Andrias, The President's Enforcement Power, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1031, 1105 (2013)
(arguing that agencies should be required to submit reports for presidential review that include

enforcement priorities and highlight regional disparities).
247.

Brett McDonnell & Daniel Schwarcz, Regulatory Contrarians, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1629, 1677

(2011) (discussing the potential of poorly designed performance metrics to create perverse agency
incentives).
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"were process oriented, not outcome oriented, measuring easy-to-count
items such as the number of reports issued or the number of hearings
attended." 248 When GAO changed its metrics to be more outcome-oriented,
GAO had to focus more "on making realistic recommendations and on
aggressively lobbying to have those recommendations implemented,"
resulting in steady improvements.24 9 A broader range of outcome-oriented
metrics for ICE that reflect a broader range of values could help address
some of the disparities discussed above.
B. Implicationsfor InstitutionalDesign
In considering oversight mechanisms, judicial oversight is often the first
to come to mind, but it is of limited use in the immigration enforcement
context due to legal constraints on judicial review. Under the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA), the basic presumption of judicial review can be
rebutted by showing that an "agency action is committed to agency
discretion by law." 0 Enforcement decisions are generally considered
discretionary and therefore unreviewable.25 1 When it comes to enforcement,
then, the main question is not about how much deference an agency should
receive, but whether any type of judicial review is permitted.1 2 To the
extent that courts may be able to review constitutional violations related to
enforcement, this "at best touch[es] only a small portion of
all [enforcement] activities."2 5 3
Because of these constraints on judicial review, the use of institutional
54
design to act as a check on an agency's use of discretion becomes critical.
This section offers a few recommendations for ways to bolster internal
checks on discretion. First, greater separation of enforcement and
248.
249.
250.
251.

Id.
Id. at 1678.
5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2).
Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831-32 (1985); Barkow, supra note 199, at 1131-33

(explaining that an agency's decisions about whether to initiate an enforcement action, whether to
provide frontline officers with guidance on enforcement, the substance of any nonbinding enforcement
policies, and budgetary allocations for enforcement activities are all exempt from judicial review).
252. A prominent example of a case involving immigration enforcement where the Supreme Court
exercised judicial review involved the legal challenge to the Trump Administration's decision to rescind

DACA. See Dep't of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891 (2020). In that
case, the Government argued that DACA is a nonenforcement policy equivalent to the nonenforcement
decision in Chaney, but the Court rejected that argument. The Court reasoned that the DACA
Memorandum not only declined to institute enforcement proceedings, but also conferred affirmative
benefits, and access to benefits is "an interest 'courts often are called upon to protect."' Id. at 1906

(quoting Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, at 832).
253.

Walker, supra note 240, at 616-17 (describing the limitation of judicial review in the context

of policing).
254. Barkow, supra note 199, at 1146-47.
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adjudicative functions, such that more removal decisions can be reviewed
by immigration judges who belong to a different agency (DOJ instead of
DHS), is one way to check unfettered discretion by ICE officers, especially
with respect to removals. Second, DHS could empower two existing
oversight bodies, OIG and CRCL, to enable them to respond more
effectively to concerns about inequitable enforcement and abuse of
discretion. Third, civilian oversight over enforcement at the field office
level could help identify, monitor, and critique regional practices and
disparities.
1. Separationof Enforcement and Adjudicative Functions
Separation of enforcement and adjudicative functions is protected to only
a limited degree in the immigration context. Agencies responsible for
enforcement, like ICE, are part of DHS, while the immigration judges and
Board of Immigration Appeals, which are responsible for adjudication, are
part of DOJ. As others have already persuasively argued, immigration
judges and the BIA are not truly independent.ss More importantly,
however, for the focus of this Article, thousands of enforcement decisions
result in removals every year without an immigration judge ever being
involved.2 6 Professor Jennifer Koh's scholarship has shed light on the
sweeping use of expedited removal, reinstatement of prior removal,
administrative removals, stipulated removal, and in absentia removal, all
processes that involve no adjudication at all.257 These types of removal
orders defy the principle that "the person who brings the enforcement action
should not also be the final judge of what should happen to the target." 258
Eliminating these processes that allow removal to occur without any review
by someone outside DHS would require a substantial change to immigration
laws, but it would also protect against unchecked power in the hands of
frontline agents.
Separation of functions can also be improved with respect to custody
determinations (i.e., detention). ICE makes the initial custody determination
about whether to detain or release someone during removal proceedings,
and what type of supervision or monitoring, if any, should be required when

255. See generally Stephen H. Legomsky, Restructuring Immigration Litigation, 59 DUKE L.J.
1635 (2010); Stephen H. Legomsky, Deportationand the War on Independence, 91 CORNELL L. REV.
369 (2006).
256. Jennifer Lee Koh, Removal in the Shadows of Immigration Court, 90 S. CAL L. REV. 181,
184 (2017).
257. Id.
258. Barkow, supra note 199, at 1148-49.
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someone is not detained.2 5 9 A noncitizen can ask an immigration judge to
review ICE's custody decision at a "bond hearing" in immigration court,
but at that hearing the noncitizen bears the burden of proving that he or she
is not a flight risk or danger to the community, rather than ICE. 260 By
contrast, in criminal proceedings, the government bears the burden of
showing, by clear and convincing evidence, that a pretrial defendant should
be detained. 261 The custody determination process for noncitizens
effectively gives ICE, an adverse party in the removal proceeding, more
power than the immigration judge to determine whether someone should be
detained. That decision about detention, in turn, affects the likelihood of
finding an attorney, the likelihood of submitting an application for relief
from removal, and ultimately the likelihood of being ordered removed, since
detained individuals fare worse at each of these stages.2 62 Simply shifting
the burden of proof in a custody determination hearing to the government,
instead of placing it on the noncitizen, could help make detention decisions
more consistent and equitable, thereby also affecting removal rates.
2. Empowering OIG and CRCL
OIG and CRCL are two bodies within DHS that oversee "compliance
with constitutional, statutory, regulatory, policy, and other requirements
relating to the civil rights and civil liberties of individuals affected by the
programs and activities of the Department." 2 63 Between January 2010 and

259.

8 C.F.R. § 236.1(g)(1) (2021) ("At the time of issuance of the notice to appear, or at any time

thereafter and up to the time removal proceedings are completed, an immigration official may issue a
Form I-286, Notice of Custody Determination.").

260. 8 C.F.R. § 1236.l(d)(1) (providing for custody redetermination by the immigration judge);
Nielsen v. Preap, 139 S. Ct. 954, 959 (2019) ("[T]he alien may secure his release if he can convince the
officer or immigration judge that he poses no flight risk and no danger to the community." (citing In re

Guerra, 24 1. & N. Dec. 37, 40 (B.I.A. 2006), abrogated by Hernandez-Lara v. Lyons 10 F.4th 19 (1st.
Cir. 2021))). But see Hernandez-Lara, 10 F.4th (holding that the government has burden of proving
danger by clear and convincing evidence or flight risk by preponderance of evidence in an immigration

bond hearing).
261. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 751-52 (1987) (finding pretrial
detention based on dangerousness constitutional and reasoning that one of the important procedural
protections is that "[t]he government must prove its case by clear and convincing evidence" (emphasis

added) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f))); see also Mary Holper, The Beast of Burden in Immigration Bond
Hearings, 67 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 75, 133 (2016) (arguing that the government should bear the burden
of proof in immigration bond hearings and analogizing to bail hearings for pretrial defendants).
262. Ingrid v. Eagly & Steven Shafer, A National Study of Access to Counsel in Immigration

Court, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (2015).
263. Margo Schlanger, Oflices of Goodness: Influence Without Authority in FederalAgencies,
36 CARDOZo L. REV. 53, 62 (2014) (quoting 6 U.S.C. § 345(a)(4)).
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July 2016, OIG received over 33,000 complaints, 44% of them against
ICE.2 64 Fewer than 300 of those complaints were investigated. 26s
Professor Margo Schlanger, who was the former head of CRCL, has
explained that the purpose of bodies like OIG and CRCL is to protect and
promote values that the agency might otherwise overlook. 266 Along the
same lines, Professor Barkow notes that inspector general offices can
"analyze how the agency is allocating limited resources to explore how its
decisions might be undermining its broader goals."2 67 For DHS, this could
mean highlighting the large percentage of certain field office's budgets
spent on arresting, detaining, and deporting noncitizens with no criminal
history, those who have been charged but not yet convicted of any crime,
and those with only minor convictions. In order to draw more attention to
the value of consistency in enforcement, OIG could specifically request that
ICE provide more data broken down by field office, as well as explain
disparities among field offices in the rates of detainer requests, arrests,
removal, and detention in order to better understand the root causes of these
disparities. 2 68
Additionally, CRCL could be empowered with greater authority to take
action in response to complaints involving abuse of discretion. 269 For
example, CRCL could be given: authority to discipline officers and provide
individual remedies to complainants; subpoena power; greater operational
independence; independent legal counsel; and a larger role in policy
264. Alice Speri, Detained, Then Violated, INTERCEPT (Apr. 11, 2018, 11:11 AM),
https://thcintercept.com/2018/04/1 I/immigration-detention-sexual-abuse-ice-dhs/
[https://perma.cc/Q3AG-DYWW].
265. Id. CRCL reports receiving 1,683 complaints against ICE between 2011 and 2016. Data on
Complaints Received,

DHS

(Apr.

29,

2019),

https://www.dhs.gov/data-complaints-received

[https://perma.cc/9VCS-Z53Z].
266. See Schlanger, supra note 263, at 103; see also Daphna Renan, PoolingPowers, 115 COLUM.
L. REV. 211, 290 n.386 (2015) (arguing that IGs benefit from "conventions of independence" that help
prevent agency interference); Shirin Sinnar, Protecting Rights from Within? Inspectors General and

National Security Oversight, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1027, 1070-74 (2013) (finding that the DOJ IG's
investigation into the treatment of post-9/11 detainees led to important reforms); Neal Kumar
Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today's Most Dangerous Branch from Within,

115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2347 (2006) (noting that IGs do not focus on the development of sound agency
policy).
267.

Barkow, supra note 199, at 1178.

268. OIG offices have examined disparities among district or regional offices in other contexts.
For example, OIG audited Warning Letters issued by FDA District Offices between 1994 and 1997,
which revealed that some offices had issued almost five times as many Warning Letters as others. OIG

found that these disparities could not be explained by differences in staff size or the distribution of
regulated firms, concluding that "District Offices vary in their philosophy and use" of Warning Letters. 8
No. 2 FDA Enforcement Manual Newsl. 1 (1999).
269. See 6 U.S.C. § 345 (authorizing CRCL to investigate complaints, provide policy advice to
Department leadership and components on civil rights and civil liberties issues, and communicate with
the public about CRCL and its activities, coordinate with the Inspector General, and submit an annual

report to Congress).
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development. 270 According to a report by the Center for American Progress,
CRCL struggles to ensure access to information and responses from DHS
27
component agencies, which may cause delays and hamper investigations. 1
Although CRCL receives thousands of complaints each year, it is able to
process only a "representative sample" 27 2 and conducts very few onsite
investigations.273 In FY 2019, for example, CRCL conducted only nine
onsite investigations. 274 Yet even those nine onsite investigations resulted
in 215 recommendations, indicating a need for substantial reforms within
DHS.
As Professor Ponomarenko notes, "purely advisory bodies can prompt
policymaking in a variety of ways-by making problems more difficult to
ignore and by arming advocates with information they need in order to push
for change[,]" but "[a]t the federal level, inspectors general often have been
ignored when they raise issues involving matters about which legislators
have decided not to care." 275 Congress therefore also has a critical role to
play in responding to concerns flagged by OIG. OIG has already reported
various disparities in immigration enforcement in the past and has required

270. Schlanger, supra note 263, at 98-99; SCOTT SHUCHART, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, BUILDING
MEANINGFUL CIVIL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT AT THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY 19 (2019), https://cdn.americanprogress.org/content/uploads/2019/03/28064808/DHS-CivilRights-Oversight-reportl.pdf [https://pcrma.cc/L4XP-6CLT]. By contrast, the U.S. Department of
Agriculture's civil rights office has authority to order the agency to take corrective actions. Schlanger,

supra note 263, at 85.
271. Id. at 8-11.
272. U.S. COMM'N ON CIV. RTS., ARE RIGHTS A REALITY? EVALUATING FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS
ENFORCEMENT:
NOVEMBER
2019
STATUTORY
REPORT
45
(2019),

https://www.usccr.gov/files/pubs/2019/11-21-Are-Rights-a-Reality.pdf

[https://perma.cc/BD83-

LZLD].
273. REBECCA GAMBLER, U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO 20-596, REPORT TO
CONGRESSIONAL COMMITEES, IMMIGRATION DETENTION: ICE SHOULD ENHANCE ITS USE OF
FACILITY OVERSIGHT DATA AND MANAGEMENT OF DETAINEE COMPLAINTS 8 (2020)
(noting that CRCL
https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-20-596.pdf [https://perma.cc/SG4D-KA3S]
received 4,865 complaints related to detention along from fiscal years 2017 through 2019).
274. Id. at 19; see also DANIEL E. MARTINEZ, GUILLERMO CANTOR & WALTER A. EWING, AM.
IMMIGR. COUNCIL, NO ACTION TAKEN: LACK OF CBP ACCOUNTABILITY IN RESPONDING TO
COMPLAINTS OF ABUSE (2014), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/no-action-

taken-lack-cbp-accountability-responding-complaints-abuse [https://perma.cc/9CAX-F68N] (finding
that 97% of complaints were about abuses by Border Patrol agents between 2009 and 2012); GUILLERMO
CANTOR & WALTER EWING, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, STILL NO ACTION TAKEN: COMPLAINTS AGAINST
BORDER
PATROL
AGENTS
GO
UNANSWERED
1
(2017),
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/still no_action_takencompl
aints_against_border patrolagentscontinuetogo_unanswered.pdf [https://perma.cc/9JDW-RXA8]
(finding that 95.9/o of 1,255 cases in which an outcome was reported resulted in "no action taken"
against the officer or agent accused of misconduct).
275. Ponomarenko, supra note 217, at 53.
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ICE to make more statistical information public, 276 enabling the types of
analyses presented in this Article. Giving OIG and CRCL greater authority
to ensure that their recommendations are implemented would help shift their
role from merely exposing problems to addressing them.
3. Establishing Regional Committees for Civilian Oversight
Civilian oversight has been part of the conversation on policing for many
decades, but it is a relatively recent addition to discussions of oversight of
federal agencies. 277 While there are dozens of articles by legal academics on
community policing, 278 hardly any law review articles have discussed
civilian oversight of ICE. One exception is an article by Professor Bill Ong
Hing that examines how ICE's raids of Swift meatpacking plants in 2006
led the United Food and Commercial Workers Union to create a
commission that included "former elected officials, labor leaders,
academics, civil rights leaders and immigration and legal experts who spent
more than a year holding regional hearings, interviewing witnesses and
soliciting input from a wide range of workers, elected officials, policy
community
and
religious
and
psychologists,
experts,
2 79
Subsequently, the commission issued a report that documented
leaders."
serious, systemic issues and recommended "vigorous oversight." 280
ICE has at least two existing mechanisms that provide potential
opportunities for civilian engagement. First, in some jurisdictions, local law
enforcement agencies have established steering committees to oversee their
involvement in immigration enforcement through 287(g) agreements. In
2010, DHS OIG recommended that ICE "frJequire 287(g) program sites to
maintain steering committees with external stakeholders, with a focus on
276. See, e.g., OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., OIG-21-29, DHS' FRAGMENTED APPROACH TO
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT AND POOR PLANNING RESULTED IN EXTENDED MIGRANT DETENTION
DURING THE 2019 SURGE 30-31 (2021), https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/202103/OIG-21-29-Mar21.pdf [https://perma.cc/G6FY-DDMX] ("Disparities and inconsistencies in several
aspects of immigration enforcement operations, navigable when apprehensions are low, were magnified
during the surge."); OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., OIG-18-67, ICE'S INSPECTIONS AND MONITORING OF
DETENTION FACILITIES DO NOT LEAD TO SUSTAINED COMPLIANCE OR SYSTEMIC IMPROVEMENTS 12
https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2018-06/OIG-18-67-JunI8.pdf
(2018),
[https://perma.cc/43JH-E8ET] ("ERO field offices' engagement in detention oversight varies widely.").
277. For a recent example of this, see Barkow, supra note 199, at 1180-85.
278. See, e.g., Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public Places:
Courts, Communities, and the New Policing, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 551 (1997); Dan M.
Kahan, Reciprocity, Collective Action, and Community Policing, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1513 (2002); Sunita
Patel, Toward Democratic Police Reform: A Vision for "Community Engagement" Provisions in DOJ
Consent Decrees, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 793 (2016).
279. Bill Ong Hing, Ethics, Morality, and Disruption of U.S. Immigration Laws, 63 U. KAN. L.
REV. 981, 1041 (2015).
280. Id. at 1042.
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ensuring compliance with the [Memorandum of Agreement]."2 8 1 OIG
explained that
[s]teering committees should not be narrowly viewed as a means to
enhance ICE and [law enforcement agency] communications, but as
a way to (1) improve program oversight and direction, (2) identify
issues and concerns regarding immigration enforcement activities,
(3) increase transparency, and (4) offer stakeholders opportunities to
2 82
communicate community-level perspectives.
Although ICE agreed with OIG's recommendation, 283 it was not
implemented.
Subsequently, in 2017, Congress directed ICE to "require the
establishment and regular use of steering committees for each [287(g)]
jurisdiction," including the participation of external stakeholders.2 84 But the
language typically included in 287(g) agreements still only requires local
jurisdictions to participate in steering committee meetings "as necessary."285
When the Center for American Progress reached out to seventy-eight
localities with 287(g) agreements in 2018 to find out if any steering
committee meetings had taken place, it discovered that only seventeen had
held steering committee meetings, and only nine had any public records of
those meetings.2 8 6 Additionally, community groups complained about
restricted public access to those meetings due to last minute changes,
prohibitions on recording meetings, and inconvenient locations that could
be hours away. 287 These findings indicate that steering committees have not
provided an effective mechanism for community oversight to date.
Another potential opportunity for civilian involvement is through ICE's
Community Engagement Office, which was established under President
Obama in 2016 and is comprised of twenty-five community relations

281.

OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., THE PERFORMANCE OF 287(G) AGREEMENTS 49 (emphasis added).

282.
283.

Id. at 16.
Id. at 49.

284. U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., DIVISION F - DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
APPROPRIATIONS
ACT
EXPLANATORY
STATEMENT (2018),

https://docs.house.gov/billsthisweek/201 8031 9/DIV%20F%20HOMELAND%20SOM%20FY 18%20
OMNI.OCR.pdf [https://pcrma.cc/LA5M-EGJW]; see also H.R. Rep. No. 115-239 (2017).
285. Claudia Flores, Rapidly Expanding287(g) ProgramSuffersfrom Lack of Transparency,CTR.
FOR
AM.
PROGRESS
(Oct.
9,
2018),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/immigration/reports/20 18/1 0/09/459098/rapidly-expanding-

287g-program-suffers-lack-transparency/ [https://perma.cc/V5WT-CCTM].
286. Id.
287. Id.
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officers (CROs) located at field offices around the country. 288 These CROs
are supposed to "serve as liaisons to the public, key stakeholders, and ICE
leadership" 28 9 and seek to "foster trust and collaboration" while "promoting
ICE's mission."2'0 However, the Community Engagement Office is one of
two offices within the Office of Partnership and Engagement. The other
office is Victims of Immigration Crime Engagement (VOICE), which was
originally proposed by President Trump's Executive Order on interior
enforcement. 2 91 As the name suggests, VOICE focused on helping the
victims of crimes committed by noncitizens and was criticized for vilifying
immigrants, rather than helping victims. 292 CROs became responsible for
the VOICE office, undermining trust with communities. 293
Given these challenges and limitations with respect to steering
committees and CROs, a more effective mechanism is needed for civilian
oversight. Professor Samuel Walker, an expert on civilian oversight in
policing, argues that the best model of civilian oversight of police
departments is the "auditor/inspector general model." 294 Unlike a traditional
civilian review board, which "investigat[es] individual citizen complaints
with the goal of determining whether an officer violated department policy,
the auditor/inspector general reviews a police department's policies and
practices with the ultimate goal of changing the organization." 295
As discussed above, DHS already has an OIG that is responsible for
oversight of the entire department. 296 A civilian body with a similar mission
288.

See

Oice

of

Partnership

https://www.ice.gov/leadership/ope
Engagement Office).

289.
290.

and

Engagement,

[https://perma.cc/N5RE-WKQ5]

ICE

(Nov.

(explaining

22,

2021),

the Community

Id.
ICE Office of Community Engagement Already Hardat Work in 2017, ICE (Oct. 8, 2020),

https://www.ice.gov/news/releases/ice-office-community-engagement-already-hard-work-2017

[https://perma.cc/J8N7-RJJV].
291. Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799, 8801

§ 13 (Jan.

30, 2017); DHS SecretaryKelly

Issues Memorandum RegardingExecutive Order on Interior Enforcement, 94 Interpreter Releases 9,

Art. 2 (Feb. 27, 2017).
292. See Laila Hass, The School to DeportationPipeline, 34 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 697, 712 (2018)
(describing VOICE as "an office to generate publicity regarding crimes committed by immigrants" and
discussing the political creation of the "criminal alien"); see also Michele Waslin, DHS Launches

Controversial

Immigration

Victims

Office,

IMMIGR.

IMPACT

(Apr.

27,

2017),

https://immigrationimpact.com/2017/04/27/dhs-launches-controversial-immigration-victims-

office/#.YCbgZi9h3FQ [https://perma.ec/BX42-9XLL] (quoting Brent Wilkes, chief executive of the
League of United Latin American Citizens as saying, "[i]t's really about trying to vilify the immigrant

population"); Dean DeChiaro, Republicans, Advocates Divided on New ICE office to Track Immigrant
Crimes, CQ ROLL CALL, Apr. 27, 2017, 2017 WL 1505013.
293.

Waslin, supra note 292 (stating that the community relations officers would assume

responsibility for VOICE despite advocates' concerns that they did not have the proper skillset).
294. Walker, supra note 240, at 646-50.
295. Id. at 647.
296. See supra Section IV.B.2.
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but a regional focus would help bring regional issues to light that OIG or
GAO could then take up. These civilian committees could help define the
regional problems that require investigation and issue their own reports and
recommendations for changes in regional practices. Members of the civilian
oversight body should have regional expertise in immigration policies and
enforcement practices, for example through work with organizations in the
region that focus on issues of immigration, detention, racial profiling, and
policing.
When Professors Keith Aoki and John Shuford coined the term
"immigration regionalism" a decade ago, they proposed that the federal
government create "immigration regions and a governance structure that
incorporates representatives of state and local governments,, as well as
private sector and civil society groups." 297 They contemplated that these
regional units "would gather and assess data and formulate policy
recommendations." 298 This "participatory administrative structure for
"regional
rational reforms" would, in their view, encourage
experimentation," with robust federal oversight. 299 Professor Aoki and
Shuford referred to these units as "regional immigration councils." 300 They
were interested in innovative regional solutions to problems like labor,
employment, access to public services, and integration. 301 Their innovative
proposal can inform ideas about how to set up regional civilian oversight
committees, which could be similarly structured but with a focus on ICE's
enforcement operations.
Civilians have played a role in enforcement by federal agencies in other
303
contexts, such as protecting endangered species, 302 measuring air quality,
and addressing regulatory challenges related to energy. 304 In those
situations, however, the civilians involved were assisting the agency with
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.

Aoki & Shuford, supra note 16, at 5.
Id.
Id. at 63.
Id. at 64.
Id.

302.

Karen Bradshaw Schulz & Dean Lueck, Contracting for Control of Landscape-Level

Resources, 100 IOWA L. REv. 2507, 2525 (2015) (discussing how Bison are "treated as domestic animals
so that landowners can gain from contracting for large bison landscapes"); see also Hannah J.

Wiseman, Delegation and Dysfunction, 35 YALE J. ON REG. 233, 256-57, 298-99 (2018) (arguing for
regulatory design changes to cooperative federalism schemes, including enhanced monitoring of federal
agencies and subfederal governments and describing the critical role played by citizens).

303. Dara O'Rourke & Gregg P. Macey, Community Environmental Policing: Assessing New
Strategies of Public Participationin EnvironmentalRegulation, 22 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 383
(2003) (describing citizens' involvement in monitoring air quality).
304. Hari M. Osofsky & Hannah J. Wiseman, Dynamic Energy Federalism,72 MD. L. REv. 773,
804-05 (2013) (discussing regional transmission organizations comprised of private actors that operate
the transmission grid, plan for necessary upgrades and new transmission capacity, and even decide how
to allocate transmission rates among utilities to cover this new capacity).
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enforcement, whereas the type of civilian involvement proposed here would
involve oversight and monitoring of the agency's own actions, which would
be more controversial and challenging. However, it helps that DHS has
already acknowledged a role for civilian involvement through existing
initiatives. Making existing opportunities for engagement more meaningful
would be a starting point.
There are also other steps the federal government could take to
encourage more community involvement. DHS could incentivize field
offices by making meaningful community engagement a performance
metric. 30 5 This is similar to the proposal set forth in The Vision for Black
Lives, which urges the Department of Justice to incentivize state and local
law enforcement agencies to adopt civilian oversight boards with
meaningful powers through a relevant performance metric. 30 6 Additionally,
the federal government could give grants for community-oriented
immigration enforcement, just as it gives millions in grants for Community
Oriented Policing Services. 307 As long as ICE continues to rely on state and
local law enforcement agencies, those agencies have an incentive to support
civilian oversight of ICE in order to establish and maintain trust with their
own communities. Expanding the concept of community-oriented policing
to include community oversight of immigration enforcement would be one
way for state and local law enforcement agencies to build trust with
immigrant groups and support more equitable enforcement.
CONCLUSION

Regional variations in the activities of federal agencies are by no means
unique to immigration. 308 However, there are unique implications when
immigration enforcement practices, which affect core liberties, differ so
dramatically across the country. By revealing the extent and nature of
regional variations in immigration enforcement across ICE's twenty-four
field offices, and specifically comparing field offices in sanctuary and
antisanctuary regions, this Article highlights the importance of adding a
regional lens to federal, state, and local analyses. Paying attention to ICE's
&

305. See A VISION FOR BLACK LIVES: POLICY DEMANDS FOR BLACK POWER, FREEDOM,
JUSTICE, DEMOCRATIC COMMUNITY CONTROL OF LOCAL, STATE, AND FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT
AGENCIES,
https://m4bl.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/CommControlofLawEnforcement-

OnePager.pdf [https://perma.cc/7G29-L5HB].
306. Id.
307. Id.
308.

See, e.g., J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, The Congressional Competition to Control

Delegated Power, 81 TEX. L. REV 1443, 1447-48 (2003) (finding "alarming" regional variation in the
implementation of the Endangered Species Act); Owen, supra note 7, at 105-07 (examining how federal
regional offices generate different regional policy outcomes in environmental regulation).
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own geographic organization reveals disparities in immigration
enforcement that may otherwise be overlooked and that risk deepening
structural racism in the United States. This Article proposes a combination
of approaches, including internal agency guidelines, rulemaking,
performance metrics, and institutional designs to help promote greater
consistency in enforcement.
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APPENDIX
Table 6: Detainer Request Rates for All Field ERO Field Offices
in FY 2019. (Rates Represent Number of Detainers Requested or

Arrests Made for Every 1,000 Unauthorized Individuals in the Field
Office's Geographic Area of Responsibility).
Field Office
Atlanta
Baltimore
Boston
Buffalo
Chicago
Dallas
Denver
Detroit
El Paso
Houston
Los Angeles
Miami
New Orleans
New York City
Newark
Philadelphia
Phoenix
Salt Lake City
San Antonio
San Diego
San Francisco
Seattle
St. Paul
Washington DC
Mean
Avg. Dev. Mean

Number of Detainer

Detainer Request

Requests

Rate

14502
1560
2552
3615
8303
10151
2934
2385
2897
10878
20555
10140
9567
4891
3251
3521
5878
5104
10293
2088
16772
3592
3997
4387
6825.5

20.3
6.9
6.9
80.3
10.5
14.8
15.8
12.6
19.6
16.9
14.1
13.9
28.2
6.2
7.6
18.8
20.9
17.7
25.0
11.2
15.6
10.0
21.7
15.9
18.0
7.6

14144.3
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